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Claims & Opinions
CLUELESS ON CLASSIFICATION: TOWARD
REMOVING ARTIFICIAL LIMITS ON CHAPTER
11 CLAIM CLASSIFICATION
by
Bruce A. Markell*
I. INTRODUCTION
Confirming a plan of reorganization under chapter 11 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code" is daunting. A plan proponent2 must affirmatively demon-
* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington. Portions of this article
appeared earlier as Chapter S in Critical Issues in Chapter 11 Bankruptcies, a publication to accom-
pany a seminar co-sponsored by the American Bar Association and the Chicago Chapter of the Fed-
eral Bar Association which occurred on May 26-27, 1994. Thanks to Douglass Boshkoff, Eva Saha
Daniel, and to Leah Lorber, each of whom read an earlier draft of this article. Errors which remain
are mine alone.
I Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 101-1330), as amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified as amended in various sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.);
Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-554, 100 Stat. 3114 (codified as amended in various sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.); Retiree
Benefits Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-334, 102 Stat. 610 (codified as amended
in various sections of 11 U.S.C.); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508,
104 Stat. 1388 (codified as amended in various sections of 11 U.S.C.); Criminal Victims Protection
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-581, 104 Stat. 2865 (codified as amended in various sections of 11
U.S.C.); Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789 (codified as amended in
various sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.); Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified as amended in various sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.); and,
Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-509,
104 Stat. 1389 (codified as amended in various sections of 28 U.S.C.); Department of Commerce
Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
121, 107 Stat. 1153 (codified as amended in various sections of 28 U.S.C.); and Bankruptcy Reform
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strate that it has met all thirteen requirements for confirmation.3 This
task is further complicated by two confirmation requirements which seem
to duplicate each other. The first, found at section 1129(a)(8) 4 of the
Code, requires each class of the debtor's creditors to approve the plan.
The second, section 1129(a)(10), 5 requires the approval of at least one
class of impaired, non-insider, creditors.
The possibility of cramdown provides the most likely explanation for
the apparent duplication. Cramdown, a bankruptcy term of art, refers to
confirmation which occurs even though the plan proponent has not ob-
tained the assent of all creditor classes. To achieve cramdown, the propo-
nent must meet all other confirmation requirements and the plan must be
"fair and equitable" and not unfairly discriminatory as to the dissenting
class.' Section 1129(a)(10) applies in cramdown; even though the plan
proponent has not obtained the consent of all classes, it must obtain the
consent of at least one impaired non-insider class.
Central to this analysis is the concept of a "class" of claims or inter-
ests. Classes vote. An impaired class must accept. Only dissenting classes
in a cramdown receive the benefit of the fair and equitable and no unfair
discrimination rules.
How are classes defined? This article addresses that question from
both a historical and an analytical perspective.' The article then examines
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 3146 (codified as amended in various sections of 11
U.S.c., 18 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Code or Code].
2 Although often the person attempting to confirm a plan will be the pre-petition debtor, the
Bankruptcy Code specifically allows other entities to propose a plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c) (1988)
(allowing "[a]ny party in interest" to file a plan so long as exclusivity has terminated).
* 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(1)-(13) (1988).
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8) (1988).
, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (1988).
6 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (1988).
' I do not write on a clean slate. Many thoughtful articles have already appeared which discuss
the issues raised in this article. See, e.g., Jeffrey C. Krause, The Bias of the Courts Against Single-
Asset Real Estate Cases Is Creating Bad Law in the Area of Classification, 22 CAL. BANKR. J. 47
(1994); Linda J. Rusch, Single Asset Cases and Chapter 11: The Classification Quandary, 1 AM.
BANKR. INsT. L. Ritv. 43 (1993) [hereinafter "Rusch, Classification Quandary"]; David G. Carlson,
The Classification Veto in Single-Asset Cases Under Bankruptcy Code Section 1129(a)(10), 44 S.C.
L. REV. 565 (1993); Peter E. Meltzer, Disenfranchising the Dissenting Creditor Through Artificial
Classification or Artificial Impairment, 66 AM. BANKR. L.J. 281 (1992); Linda J. Rusch, Gerry-
mandering the Classification Issue in Chapter Eleven Reorganizations, 63 U. CoLo. L. REV. 163
(1992) [hereinafter "Rusch, Gerrymandering and Classification"]; John C. Anderson, Classification
of Claims and Interests in Reorganization Cases under the New Bankruptcy Code, 58 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 99 (1984); Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Classification of Claims and Interests in Chapter 11 and 13
Cases, 75 CAL. L. REV. 391 (1987); William Blair, Classification of Unsecured Claims in Chapter
11 Reorganizations, 58 AM. BANKR. L.J. (1984); Thomas C. Givens & Linda J. Phillips, Equality
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the existing reorganization provisions that bear on claim classification and
the court opinions that explore these provisions. Too often, these opinions
use terms such as "gerrymandering," or "artificial" impairment as emo-
tional support for disallowing certain forms of classification. This article
proposes that the current state of the law (at least the majority of it) is
presently wrong and continuing to head in the wrong direction.
To replace the current tests and standards, I offer the following as a
proposed construction of section 1122, the section of the Code governing
classification: courts should permit any classification proposed by a chap-
ter 11 plan unless a dissenter can establish that the challenged classifica-
tion would combine, to the dissenter's detriment, creditors or shareholders
with different non-bankruptcy liquidation priorities. A dissenter can es-
tablish detriment if the plan would transfer property or value preserved
by the reorganization from the class in which the dissenter has been
placed to another class having a different non-bankruptcy liquidation pri-
ority. Although somewhat cumbersome, this formulation essentially means
that any classification is proper so long as it does not combine claims that
have different non-bankruptcy priorities, such as mixing secured and un-
secured claims in one class.
This test attempts to honor the structure and history of plan confir-
mation. It preserves the balance of negotiating power anticipated by the
Code and its system of confirmation, giving effect to the compromises in-
herent in the Code enactment in 1978.8 In so doing, it seeks to prevent the
involuntary transfer of any portion of the going concern surplus9 among
non-consenting classes having different non-bankruptcy liquidation
priorities.
The test is also fairly mechanical in application; that is, it looks only
at the effect of a proposed classification, not at its motive. This limitation
is intentional. The Code already provides subjective tests of the parties'
motivations - there must be good faith in voting and in proposing the
plan. 10 On the other hand, the text of section 1122, as well as the text of
in the Eye of the Beholder-Classification of Claims and Interests in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 43
OHIO ST. L.J. 735 (1982).
s See supra note 1.
The going concern surplus, loosely defined, is the surplus of value preserved by keeping a
debtor in business. One might define the difference to be the premium a person would pay for the
debtor as a going concern, as opposed to the price she would pay just for the individual assets of the
firm. The premium may be related to the one-time costs of starting any enterprise, the positive exter-
nalities arising from the combination of the existing assets, the intangible qualities of the asset combi-
nation (commonly called goodwill), or a combination of some or all of these. See infra note 12.
10 11 U.S.C. §§ 1126(e), 1129(a)(3) (1988).
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sections 1124 and 1129(a)(10), says nothing about the subjective motiva-
tions of the parties. It looks only to the effect of the proposed plan on a
creditor's claim."'
Similar to section 1122, the proposed test says nothing about what
claims a plan must classify together. One controversial consequence of this
test is that it expressly validates classes regardless of the motive for creat-
ing them, and thus essentially gives the plan proponent free reign in clas-
sification. I defend this and other conseqiiences of the test through an
analysis of the history of classification, the Supreme Court's current views
on statutory interpretation, the Bankruptcy Code, and the policy consider-
ations contained in the current Code. In conclusion, the paper illustrates
the application of this standard in common chapter 11 situations.
II. WHY CLASSIFY CLAIMS?
To answer the question posed by the section heading, begin by exam-
ining the typical business debtor. It has subtantial assets, has given some-
one a security interest in some or all of these assets, owes taxes and wages,
and has a fair amount of unsecured trade credit. Add to this mix an in-
ability to pay all of its debts as they become due. With some form of debt
relief, however, this debtor will continue and be worth more than if it is
liquidated.
If we really believe that the business is worth more together than
apart,12 a key issue will be choosing the best form of debt relief to pre-
21 11 U.S.C. §§ 1122, 1124, 1129(a)(10) (1988).
12 This is a fundamental assumption in reorganizations. As stated in the legislative history of the
Code:
The purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike a liquidation case, is to restructure a
business's finances so that it may continue to operate, provide its employees with jobs, pay
its creditors, and produce a return for its stockholders. The premise of a business reorgani-
zation is that assets that are used for production in the industry for which they were
designed are more valuable than those same assets sold for scrap. Often, the return on
assets that a business can produce is inadequate to compensate those who have invested in
the business. Cash flow problems may develop, and require creditors of the business, both
trade creditors and long-term lenders, to wait for payment of their claims. If the business
can extend or reduce its debts, it often can be returned to a viable state. It is more economi-
cally efficient to reorganize than to liquidate, because it preserves jobs and assets.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220 (1977).
The Supreme Court has also spoken, in passing, about the purpose of chapter 11. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984) ("The fundamental purpose of reorganiza-
tion is to prevent a debtor from going into liquidation, with an attendant loss of jobs and possible
misuse of economic resources."); United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983) ("By
permitting reorganization, Congress anticipated that the business would continue to provide jobs, to
satisfy creditors' claims, and to produce a return for its owners .... Congress presumed that the assets
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serve that value. A system could be developed where a government agent,
such as a paid administrator or a standing trustee, selects the form of
reorganization. Some commentators argue that the present chapter 11 is
closer to this system than we care to admit,"3 but presently that is not
what we have. Under chapter 11, the participants or some subset of them
help to select the form of reorganization. 4 Confirmation cannot occur un-
less every impaired class has the opportunity to accept or reject the pro-
posed reorganization plan.
A. The History of Classification
Creditors did not always vote in the manner that they do today. Cur-
rent reorganization statutes are a mosaic of two distinct lines of reorgani-
zation thought. The first, which I call the "democracy" or "creditor-cen-
tered" approach, minimized the involvement of a court. It gave effect to
the decision of a pre-defined number or percentage of creditors as to the
form and extent of debt relief. The second, which I call the "administra-
tive" or "creditor-protective" approach, integrated a court or an adminis-
trative agency into the process of determining whether a particular form
of debt relief was proper.
1. Compositions and Arrangements
The creditor-centered approach finds its origins in the way the com-
mon law treated the composition of creditors. Under common law, a
debtor in financial difficulty would enter into a master contract with most
or all of its creditors for debt relief. These contracts, known as composi-
of the debtor would be more valuable if used in a rehabilitated business than if 'sold for scrap.' ").
This assumption has long historical roots. After the passage of the 1861 British Bankruptcy Act,
see infra note 19, which was the first act to allow a majority of creditors to bind a dissenting minority
to keep the debtor in business, the following testimony was given:
Of course, under compositions much larger dividends are paid, because either in bank-
ruptcy or under assignments you deal with the debtors' [sic] estate at winding-up prices;
whereas, under compositions, you deal with it as a going concern, and you receive divi-
dends larger in proportion.
Report from the Select Committee on the [English] Bankruptcy Act [of 1861]; Together with the
Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix and Index 84 (1864) [hereinafter
"1861 English Report"] (testimony of Mr. Federic John Reed, English solicitor).
" See, e.g., James W. Bowers, The Fantastic Wisconsylvania Zero-Bureaucratic-Cost School of
Bankruptcy Theory: A Comment, 91 MicH. L. REv. 1773 (1993).
"4 This point comes about after a combined reading of § 1129(a)(8) and 1129(a)(10) of the
Code. Pursuant to § 1129(a)(8), a consensual reorganization requires the consent of all classes of
creditors and equity security holders. Even in a non-consensual reorganization, however,
§ 1129(a)(10) requires at least one class of impaired, non-insider, creditors to consent.
1995]
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tion agreements, could modify maturity dates, interest rates, or other
terms of the debt owed. Creditors who did not sign the composition agree-
ment were not affected by the sacrifices contained in the document.1 5 This
flowed from the common law notion that an entity was not bound unless
it assented to the change."'
Starting in 1874, federal legislation attempted to foster compositions
by providing that, if certain procedural requirements were met, a less
than unanimous composition could be confirmed by a bankruptcy court.1 7
Its terms would then become binding on all creditors, even those who did
not agree with the composition." The 1874 legislation, which had its
roots in English 9 and Scottish2 ° law, bound dissenting creditors if two
15 RICHARD F. BROUDE, REORGANIZATIONS UNDER CHAPTER 11 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
1.01, 11.06 (1994).
"6 Id. When Congress altered this rule in 1874, see infra note 17, at least one court believed
Congress' change was in derogation of the common law right of unanimity, and thus strictly construed
the provisions of the 1874 legislation. In re Shields, 21 F. Cas. 1308, 1309 (D. Iowa 1877) (No.
12,284).
11 Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 390, § 17, 18 Stat. 178 (repealed 1878) (amending § 43 of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1867) [hereinafter "1874 Act"].
18 Id.
The Bankruptcy Act of 1869, 32 & 33 Vict., ch. 71, § 126 (Eng.) [hereinafter "1869 Act"].
This section allowed for a court-approved composition as an alternative to bankruptcy. The alterna-
tive was attractive since unanimity of creditor approval was not necessary. Instead, any composition
approved by a majority in number, and 75% in value, of creditors at a duly convened meeting would
bind dissenting creditors. Id.
In calculating approval, creditors holding debts of ten pounds or less counted for the value re-
quirement only, but not for the numerosity requirement. Id. Although this section permitted secured
creditors to vote at the general meetings, another section limited their vote by stating that "[a] secured
creditor [was] for the purposes of voting,.., deemed to be a creditor only in respect of the balance (if
any) due to him after deducting the value of his security." Id. at § 16(4).
The 1869 Act simply carried forward the innovations incorporated in the English Bankruptcy
Act of 1861. Act of 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., ch. 134 (1861) (Eng.) (Amending law relating to bankruptcy
in England) [hereinafter "1861 Act"]. Under this Act, compositions were also binding on all creditors
if agreed to by a majority in number of creditors holding 75% of the amount of claims. Id. at §§ 187
and 192. When calculating the number and amount voting, the Act excluded the claims of creditors
who owed less than ten pounds. Id. at § 192(1) and (5).
After passage of the 1861 Act, Parliament appointed a committee to investigate the implementa-
tion of the Act. The committee heard testimony from both Scotland and Ireland on the required level
of creditor assent. See 1861 English Report, supra note 12, at 112-13 (statement of Mr. James Wyllie
Guild, Scottish accountant and testimony of Mr. Henry Oldham, Irish solicitor). The committee also
heard testimony on the effectiveness of, and satisfaction with, the composition provisions of the 1861
Act. Id. at 84-85 & 185 (testimony of Mr. Federic John Reed, English solicitor and testimony of Mr.
Darnton Lupton, President of the Leed). Given the continuance of the majority in number and 75%
in value requirement, it appears that local satisfaction with the composition provisions prevailed.
Earlier English law provided for a variety of compositions, each of which, however, required a
cessio bonorum; that is, a bankrupt is required to "turn over all his property to his creditors, in order
to make the composition valid in case there were dissenting creditors." WM. MILLER COLLIER, THE
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requirements were met: first, approval by a majority of creditors, holding
three-quarters of the debt owed, who were present at a duly convened
meeting of creditors, and second, written confirmation of the earlier ap-
proval by at least two-thirds of all the debtor's creditors who themselves
held at least a majority of the debt owed by the debtor. 1
In making these calculations, all creditors holding claims less than
fifty dollars and secured creditors holding deficiency claims were not con-
sidered when determining whether the necessary number of creditors
agreed. The debts of both classes, however, were counted when determin-
LAW OF BANKRUPTCY AND THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1898 115-16 (1899); Act of 1824,
6 GEO 4, ch. 16, § 133 (1824) (Eng.) (providing for binding composition if 90% of the creditors
actually voting, who held claims in excess of twenty pounds, agreed to composition); Act of 1849, 12
& 13 Vict., ch. 106, § 215-16 (1849) (Eng.) (providing for binding public arrangement if consented
to by 60% of creditors, in number and value, holding proved debts of ten pounds or more); 1861 Act
§ 224 (providing for binding private composition if agreed to by 6/7 of all creditors holding debts of
ten pounds or more); 1861 Act § 230-31 (providing for binding composition after adjudication of
bankruptcy if agreed to by 90% of the voting creditors, holding claims in excess of twenty pounds).
The 1861 legislation did away with the requirement that the debtor turn over all of his or her prop-
erty, and the 1869 legislation kept this change. See COLLIER, supra.
20 Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act of 1856, 19 & 20 Vict., ch. 79 (1856) (Eng.). Under this Act, a
majority of creditors holding at least 80% in value could "sist," or stay, the bankruptcy proceedings,
for a maximum of two months, in order to effect an arrangement. Id. at § 35. If during that time 80%
of the creditors holding 80% of the claims agreed, they could force the terms of a composition on
unwilling minorities. Id. at § 38. The debtor could also offer a composition at the meeting for the
election of trustee or at the meeting held after his examination. Id. at § 139. The debtor's offer of
composition must receive an affirmative approval of 90% of all creditors. Id. at §§ 137-38. In any
case, the debtor received a discharge from all debts subject to a surrender of all property to the
jurisdiction of the "Lord Ordinary," that is, the equity judge, or sheriff. Id. at § 140.
21 1874 Act § 17. The actual threshold amounts for approval were initially taken from the 1869
British Act, but were the subject of open negotiation between the House and Senate. 2 CONG. REC.
1143, 1268 (1874) (statement of Sen. Edmunds). The House, it seems, wanted a simple majority. Id.
at 5061. The Senate, spurred by letters from business leagues, however, saw the matter as "a business
question" and held to higher percentage requirements. Id. at 1268 & 5066. As explained by Senator
Edmunds:
I believe that this is substantially in accordance with the English act of composition, though
I think [the second vote] in the English law requires only a half of each; but as we have
made the earlier part of the composition a little more favorable to the creditors than the
English law did in some respects, I think it right, as this discharges a debt due to a man
against his consent by a proposition to give time instead of winding up the estate, that it
should take a little greater number of people to consent to it than is provided for in the
English law under the other circumstances.
Id. at 1352.
Collier also traced the 1874 legislation to § 126 of the 1869 English legislation. See COLLIER,
supra note 19, at 115. See also 2 CONG. REC. 1143, 1352 (1874) (statement of Sen. Edmunds); In re
Scott, Collins & Co., 21 F. Cas. 805, 806-10 (E.D. Mo. 1876) (No. 12,519) (comparing similar
provisions of 1874 American Act with 1869 British Act).
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ing whether there was sufficient amount of debt in agreement. 2 Fully
secured creditors were not counted at all, unless they "relinquish[ed their
security]" for the benefit of the estate.23
The 1874 legislation had a short life, being repealed in 1878.24 Start-
ing with section 12 of the 1898 Act, however, compositions became an
integral part of federal bankruptcy legislation. 25  Section 12 of that Act
carried forward the notion of the composition, 2 but for reasons that are
not clear, lowered the threshold of assent to simply a majority in number
and amount of the creditors.27 The 1898 Act also added explicit require-
ments that the court find the composition to be in the "best interests of
creditors" and that it was proposed in "good faith."28
22 1874 Act § 17.
23 Id.
Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 160.
25 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, § 12 (repealed 1934) [hereinafter the "Bank-
ruptcy Act"]. In the interim, Massachusetts enacted a law specifically providing for an insolvency
discharge through the compositiQn format. 1884 Mass. Acts, ch. 195-99, as amended by 1885 Mass.
Acts, ch. 811-12, 1889 Mass. Acts, ch. 1090-91, 1890 Mass. Acts, ch. 350-51, 1897 Mass. Acts, ch.
216-18. Under this law, a majority in number and value of "general creditors," whose claims had
been proved, was necessary to confirm a composition if it returned at least 50% to creditors; a 75%
vote was required if the return to creditors was less than 50 cents on the dollar. 1885 Mass. Acts, ch.
811-12. In all cases, priority claims did not count for either the numerosity or the value requirement,
and claims less than $50 did not count for the numerosity requirement. Bankruptcy Act § 2.
As originally enacted, the vote had to be of all creditors, not just those with proved claims. 1884
Mass. Acts, ch. 197. The 1885 amendments changed this to the vote of creditors with proved claims to
make it easier for debtors to confirm compositions. 1885 Mass. Acts, ch. 811-12. See Fenton v. Gra-
ham, 161 Mass. 554, 556 (1894). Finally, from 1884 until 1897, corporations could not take advan-
tage of the composition provisions. 1884 Mass. Acts, ch. 199 and 1897 Mass. Acts, ch. 216.
:6 Bankruptcy Act § 12. These provisions resembled the 1874 provisions, but differed in that
while the 1874 legislation permitted a composition either before or after adjudication of bankruptcy,
the original 1898 Act only allowed a composition after the debtor had been adjudicated a bankrupt.
The 1910 amendments to the 1898 Act changed this so that a debtor could propose a composition
before, as well as after, adjudication as a bankrupt. Act of June 25, 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-294, ch.
412, 36 Stat. 838.
27 During the debates on the 1898 Act, the following response was given as to why the threshold
was not left at two-thirds:
You might just as well say, 'Why not leave it to seven-eights or nine-tenths?' A majority
seems to be the rule of life in such matters. The only intent of this was to get an absolute
settement .... [ 1] And we have further protection by providing that if within six months
after the adjudication has been made it is shown that fraud was perpetrated, the composi-
tion can be reopened . .. ."
28 CONG. REc. 4540 (1896) (statement of Rep. Henderson) (emphasis added). Indeed, it appeared
many viewed the composition provisions, with their lower standards of acceptance, as a palliative to
the provisions of the bill which made it easier to file an involuntary proceeding. 30 CONG. REc. 602
& 629 (1897) (statements of Sen. Lindsay and Sen. Hoar).
28 Bankruptcy Act § 12d. These additions were designed to allow creditors to "pass upon the
honesty of a debtor and to calculate the worth of their claims." 25 CoNG. Rnc. 2783 (1893) (remarks
1995] Claim Classification
Chapter XI, enacted in 1938, began as an amendment to section
12.29 Chapter XI expanded the requirements of a composition, but contin-
ued the notion of a majority in number and amount as the necessary
threshold for binding minorities.30 This legislation also explicitly provided
for segmentation of unsecured claims, the only claims which chapter XI
purported to effect, into different classes. 1
2. Equity Receiverships and Chapter X
As was the case with section 12 compositions, chapter XI had several
drawbacks. The rights of secured creditors32 and the interests of equity
holders could not be affected absent the unanimous consent of those in-
volved.3 3 When the major railroads and other large companies of the day
needed reorganization, however, they had to deal with diverse groups of
secured creditors and equity holders.3
and analysis of Rep. Oates).
29 1A COTTITER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 12.01, at 1231 (14th ed. 1978). The move to amend § 12
was sponsored by various associations representing creditors. SEC v. United States Realty & Imp.
Co., 310 U.S. 434, 450 n.8 (1940).
80 11 U.S.C. § 762(1) (original version at July 1, 1898, ch. 541, as amended by § 362(1), June
22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 911) (repealed 1979)).
81 11 U.S.C. § 757(1) (original version at July 1, 1898, ch. 541, as amended by § 357(1), June
22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840) (repealed 1979)).
When Congress was reforming the bankruptcy laws in the 1930s, the House of Representatives
had passed a bill which provided for non-consensual compositions if its terms were fair. This was
ultimately rejected by the Senate, and the 1933 revision to § 12 (moving it to § 74) did not change
the majority approval provision. See S. REP'. No. 1215, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1933) (stating that if
a majority of creditors would not accept a proposed composition, then "[iut is not believed to be a
practical thing to impose this duty [of involuntarily adjusting debts] upon a referee in bankruptcy, a
Federal judge, or any other human being, for that matter. No person ought to be compelled to sit in
judgment upon the application of a debtor to protect him and his property from creditors who are
insisting that the money due them be promptly paid.").
8 An early edition of COLLIER indicated that "[slecured claims will be counted [in a § 12 com-
position] only to the amount unsecured; they can be 'allowed' only to such amount." 1 COLUER ON
BANKRUPTCY § 12 IV(e)(3), at 319 (12th ed. 1921). The treatise goes on to state that "[m]ortgagees
whose debts are dependent solely upon the contingency of a deficiency arising upon foreclosure are
neither necessary nor proper parties to a proposed composition." Id.
"8 As a consequence, in 1938, Congress made explicit what had been implicit under § 12: that
arrangements were only for the adjustment of the rights of unsecured creditors. 11 U.S.C. §§ 706(1),
707 (repealed 1979). For a general overview of the weaknesses of compositions as applied to large
corporations, see 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY T 7.41, at 1334-35 (14th ed. 1978).
" As stated in the legislative history of § 77:
These [composition] provisions, as now drawn, are obviously unavailable for the adjust-
ment of the claims of creditors and security holders involved in the reorganization of a
large corporation, not because the principle of composition is inapplicable to such cases but
merely because the statute is not drawn to meet the complexities of the situations
BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL
Before 1933, equity receiverships were the primary vehicle used to
reorganize these entities."5 In these cases, courts adopted a more creditor-
protective point of view. They independently scrutinized the fairness of
the proposed plan of reorganization and only allowed voting after they
determined that the reorganization's terms were fair.
After 1933, railroad reorganizations proceeded under section 77,8
while reorganizations for other corporate entities proceeded under section
77B37 (before 1938) or chapter X (until 1979).38 Each of these provisions
chose an affirmative "two-thirds in amount of claims or interests" to ap-
prove a plan.39
These reorganizations were also more creditor-protective. Under
these systems, an affirmative vote of the creditor body was not sufficient to
confirm a good faith plan. Following the lead of equity receiverships, the
plan proponent had to comply with the absolute priority rule for every
creditor.40 Moreover, since the reorganization could affect more than just
unsecured creditors, questions arose regarding how to organize the partici-
pants by class, and what each classification could do.
Some of these questions were handled by legislation. Both section
77B and chapter X required the court to divide creditors and stockholders
into classes according to their interests.4 1 With respect to a lender's defi-
ciency claim, section 77B permitted, but did not mandate, the court to
"classify as an unsecured claim, the amount of any secured claim in excess
of the value of the security therefor .. ..*"" Chapter X was more specific;
it stated that the court "shall . . .determine summarily the value of the
security and classify as unsecured the amount in excess of such value."1
43
Claims which were paid in full or which were not affected, were not
presented.
S. REP. No. 1215, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1933).
"5 Bruce A. Markell, Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy Reorganizations,
44 STAN. L. REv. 69, 75 (1991) [hereinafter Markell, Owners, Auctions].
56 Act of March 3, 1933, ch. 204, § 77, 47 Stat. 1467, 1474.
Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, § 77B, 48 Stat. 911, 912.
11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (repealed 1979).
8 Act of March 3, 1933, ch. 204, § 77(e), 47 Stat. 1467, 1478; Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424,
§ 77B(e)(1), 48 Stat. 911, 918; 11 U.S.C. § 579 (repealed 1979).
'0 Markell, Owners, Auctions, supra note 35, at 84-85.
"' Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, § 77B(c)(6), 48 Stat. 911, 916; 11 U.S.C. § 197 (repealed
1979).
42 Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, § 77B(b)(5), 48 Stat. 911, 916; 11 U.S.C. § 597 (repealed
1979).
'" 11 U.S.C. § 197 (repealed 1979).
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placed in a class and thus did not vote on the reorganization."" Finally,
Congress believed that claims having different liquidation priorities should
be placed in different classes.45
These reorganizations adopted a more administrative approach. As
an initial matter, chapter X required a higher level of class acceptance.
Acceptance occurred only with the approval of "two-thirds in amount of
the claims filed and allowed of each class."'4" In addition, under the abso-
lute priority rule, reorganizations could not be confirmed unless each sen-
ior claimant received its full share of reorganization value before any jun-
ior claimant could retain an interest in the reorganized entity.47 Chapter
XI, at least after 1952, contained no such provision. 8 Chapter X also
required the automatic appointment of an independent trustee to run the
business until it reorganized, if the indebtedness was $250,000 or more.49
In chapter XI, the debtor remained in possession unless a party in interest
sought the appointment of a trustee or receiver." Finally, chapter X re-
quired a higher percentage of creditor approval before minorities were
bound. Chapter X required an affirmative vote from creditors holding
two-thirds of the amount of debt affected, 1 while chapter XI continued
the majority in number and amount from the earlier composition
"" Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, § 77B(b)(5), 48 Stat. 911, 914. For chapter X, see CoLLIER,
supra note 33, at 1338.
"I Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, 48 Stat. 911, 915 (1934) (incorporating priority rules from
equity receivership practice); S. REP. No. 510, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934). The practice of sepa-
rately classifying priority claims can be traced back to the 1884 Massachusetts composition statute.
See supra note 25. This practice of separately classifying priority claims carried over into chapter X
practice. COLLIER, supra note 33, at 1601.
"" Bankruptcy Act § 179, 11 U.S.C. § 579 (repealed 1979). Chapter XII, which applied to non-
corporate real estate reorganizations, also enabled debtors to modify the rights of creditors holding
different liquidation priorities, including mortgage holders and unsecured creditors. Id. at §§ 406-
526. This chapter also required a two-thirds vote of each affected class for confirmation. Id. at
§ 468(1). The differences are explored in Rusch, Gerrymandering and Classification, supra note 7,
at 189-92.
"' Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 115 (1939). Recall that in Case, the
complaining bondholder held but $13,500 of a $3,800,000 bond issue. Markell, Owners, Auctions,
supra note 35, at 84 n. 101.
48 Pub. L. No. 82-456, § 35, 66 Stat. 420, 433 (1952). See also Markell, Owners, Auctions,
supra note 35, at 92 n. 152. Chapter XII also did not require plans to be fair and equitable. Bank-
ruptcy Act §§ 472-526, 11 U.S.C. § 872 (repealed 1979).
49 Bankruptcy Act § 156, 11 U.S.C. § 556 (repealed 1979).
:0 Bankruptcy Act § 342, 11 U.S.C. § 742 (repealed 1979).
1 Bankruptcy Act § 216(7), 11 U.S.C. § 616(7) (repealed 1979). If the debtor was solvent,
equity interests could be modified by only a majority vote. Bankruptcy Act § 216(8), 11 U.S.C.
§ 216(8) (repealed 1979).
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provisions.a
3. The Mosaic
Congress attempted to fuse these two strands of reorganization in
1978. With the adoption of the Code, Congress created one form of reor-
ganization instead of several. This new form of reorganization, titled
chapter 11, resembled a mosaic of previous practice. Congress chose chap-
ter X's full scope of relief, but retained chapter XI's concept of a debtor in
possession.5 ' Exclusivity from chapter XI also remained, but in combina-
tion with a modified version of chapter X's absolute priority rule.5
Classification presented a different issue. One Code innovation was
the modification of chapter X's absolute priority rule. It continued as the
baseline for non-consensual reorganizations, but with a twist. Absolute
priority rights were no longer creditor specific-they could now be altered
by class vote. Congress combined the chapter X and chapter XI rules to
govern this class vote. The result was similar to the solution proposed in
1874: both a numerosity requirement and an amount of debt requirement.
Chapter XI provided the numerosity,5" more than one-half of the claims
voting; chapter X provided the amount,"' at least two-thirds in amount of
the debt voting.57
This may be interesting history, but what relevance does the previous
history have on the interpretation of current section 1122? If nothing else,
the history of classification constitutes the history of the effort to construct
classes so as to enable them to vote on debt relief.58 Behind the assumption
52 Bankruptcy Act § 362(1), 11 U.S.C. § 762(1) (repealed 1979).
Bankruptcy Act § 342, 11 U.S.C. § 742 (repealed 1979); 11 U.S.C. § 1101 (1988).
Bankruptcy Act § 306(1), 11 U.S.C. § 706(1) (repealed 1979); 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (1988).
Bankruptcy Act § 362(1), 11 U.S.C. § 762(1) (repealed 1979).
Bankruptcy Act § 216(7), 11 U.S.C. § 616(7) (repealed 1979).
As set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (1988):
A class of claims has accepted a plan if such plan has been accepted by creditors, other
than any entity designated under subsection (e) of this section, that hold at least two-thirds
in amount and more than one-half in number of the allowed claims of such class held by
creditors, other than any entity designated under subsection (e) of this section, that have
accepted or rejected such plan.
With respect to classes of equity interests, the standard is approval of class members actually voting
and who hold "at least two-thirds in amount of the allowed interests of such class. " Id. at
§ 1126(d).
" In constructing consent mechanisms for plan confirmation, other questions might arise. For
example, is being owed money both a necessary and a sufficient qualification for participating? Sec-
tion 1165, as did its predecessor § 77 of the Act, provides that in connection with railroad reorganiza-
tions, a court is to "consider the public interest in addition to the interests of the debtor, creditors, and
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that voting is meaningful lies the notion that some common interest exists
among the members of a class. Otherwise, it makes little sense to say that
anything less than a unanimous vote could bind dissenters.
The search for commonality among creditors starts with the proposi-
tion that all creditors are alike. The 1874 Bankruptcy Act, for example,
simply referred to "all the creditors of the debtor."59 From this grouping,
however, the 1874 Act excluded creditors to the extent they were fully
secured.60 The 1884 Massachusetts Act excluded creditors with priority.61
The 1898 Bankruptcy Act did not allow compositions or arrangements
under chapter XI to affect secured claims or equity interests.62
It is not until the enactment of section 77B in 1934 that distinctions
were also drawn among claimholders sharing the same non-bankruptcy
liquidation priority. Section 77B distinguished between separate deficiency
claims and regular unsecured claims, between unsecured claims which
would have had priority in equity receiverships, and those that would not,
and between and among various classes of equity securities.63
Bankruptcy law has come a long way from the simple model of se-
cured, unsecured, and equity classes that supported the 1874 legislation.
Apart from the rising number of priorities among unsecured creditors,
modern financial wizards debate hybrid instruments such as debt which is
convertible into or payable in common stock, or common stock which is
puttable for cash.6 4 State and federal law contain numerous priorities
within the general class of unsecured claims. 65 The evolution of classifica-
equity security holders." 11 U.S.C. § 1165 (1988). See also 11 U.S.C. § 1173(a)(4) (1988) (plan
may be confirmed only if "consistent with the public interest").
Second, even if we think creditors are appropriately grouped, do we have confidence in the proce-
dural regularity of the balloting process? All early composition statutes relied upon examinations of
debtors under oath to establish that the debtor was not hiding any assets or benefits from creditors. See
supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text. This practice was carried over into § 12 compositions.
Bankruptcy Act § 12. That Act, however, specifically provided that a composition could be set aside
for fraud in its procurement. Id. at § 13. Section 13 was the forerunner of § 1144 of the current
Code.
Finally, will forcing a minority to accept a plan be antithetical to the continuation of the business
being reorganized? Current reorganizations address this, if at all, through the notion of feasibility. 11
U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (1988).
89 1874 Act § 17.
I0 d.
01 See supra note 25.
02 Bankruptcy Act § 12.
63 See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
"See, e.g., Alexander Triantis & George Triantis, Conversion Rights and the Design of Finan-
cial Instruments, 72 WASH. U.L.Q. 1231 (1994).
65 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
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tion appears to follow the evolving complexity of financial life.
If any generality can be drawn from the history of classification, it
seems to be this: before 1978, classification under the creditor-protective
model prevalent in equity receiverships and chapter X of the 1898 Act
was synonymous with non-bankruptcy liquidation priorities. The higher
two-thirds requirement for voting reflected a concern for more consensus
among creditors given the wider range of possible relief.
Under the democratic model used in compositions and chapter XI,
however, a lower level of approval, the simple majority, reflected an as-
sumption that liquidation priorities were not at risk. It also reflected the
view that the proper form of consideration could be the subject of reasoned
debate, and that the way to expedite arrangements was to lower the con-
sent requirement. This lowering of the threshold for approval effectively
took away the veto power that large claims, or large groups of claims,
could have.
In other words, and with somewhat more abstraction, pre-Code clas-
sification of claims in compositions and arrangements arose as a device to
allocate value within a group. Further, since all members of that group
shared the same liquidation priority, all members had essentially the same
motives with respect to the continuation of the debtor because that deci-
sion increased or decreased the return on their claims. In short, voting in
classes provided a method of allocating the going concern surplus value
within that group.
This abstraction also applied to reorganizations under equity receiv-
erships and chapter X. The ability, however, to implement a far wider
range of relief, which in some cases was involuntary, was thought to jus-
tify a higher threshold of approval and more ability to create different
classes. In addition, the applicability of the absolute priority rule to these
reorganizations acted to ensure that there was no non-consensual spillover
of going concern surplus from one group to the next.
Under both regimes, dissenting minorities had other means of pro-
tecting their interests. Until the Code's adoption, for example, each credi-
tor in a chapter XI proceeding could invoke the best interests test. This
test ensured that each creditor received an amount equal to its liquidation
entitlement.6 Each creditor in chapter X had the protection of the abso-
lute priority rule." Due to the absolute priority rule in chapter X and the
limited relief in chapter XI, classification did not greatly concern un-
e Bankruptcy Act § 366(2), 11 U.S.C. § 766(2) (repealed 1979).
e See Markell, Owners, Auctions, supra note 35, at 83-90.
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secured creditors; in theory, before equity could continue to participate in
any significant reorganization, it had to ensure that each creditor was paid
in full. Although classes could vote on the allocation of value, the vote did
not extend to a waiver of priority. Any creditor could object to confirma-
tion based on equity retaining an interest, even if that creditor was a
member of a class that voted in favor of the plan.
This system changed in 1978. Although the Code adopted chapter
XI's best interests test for each creditor,68 it allowed classes to waive what
before had been individual absolute priority rights.69 This added to the
stakes. Classification was no longer a by-word for liquidation priority.
Instead, it became a device that could actually alter liquidation priorities.
Put another way, classification no longer dealt primarily with allocation
of value within a class; it became a device for allocation of value within
and among classes holding different liquidation priorities. The Code thus
made individual absolute priority rights subordinate, in many cases, to a
majority determination that the debtor should be reorganized.
B. The Current Rule on Classification
The words chosen by Congress to accomplish this major change were
both important and relatively banal.7 0 Section 1122(a) states that:
[A] plan may place a claim or an interest in a particular class only if such
claim or interest is substantially similar to the other claims or interests of
such class.71
Thus, section 1122(a) states a rule of inclusion. It tells us when a plan
proponent may place two or more participants in the same class. This
follows the historic use of classification as a means of separating creditors
with different liquidation priorities and reiterates the legislative history
that states that the statute "codifies current case law."'7 2 Although Con-
68 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (1988).
' See Markell, Owners, Auctions, supra note 35, at 88.
70 The legislative history of § 1122 is reviewed in Rusch, Gerrymandering and Classification,
supra note 7, at 183-86.
71 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (1988).
72 S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 118 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5904; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 406 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6362. These statements, standing alone, are not much help. Different chapters under the Act used
different classification standards. Bankruptcy Act § 357, 11 U.S.C. § 757 (repealed 1979) and Bank-
ruptcy Act § 216, 11 U.S.C. § 621 (repealed 1979). There is also some thought that the interpreta-
tions of the standard in each chapter could vary from "court to court." BROUDE, supra note 15, at [
1995]
BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL
gress imported the higher acceptance requirements from chapter X, it
kept chapter XI's flexibility in sorting classes within the same non-bank-
ruptcy liquidation priority.
Stating the rule, however, tells only part of the story. What section
1122(a) does not explain is when substantially similar claims may be clas-
sified separately.73 In some respects, this omission is not surprising. Since
absolute priority could not be waived by a class prior to 1978, classifica-
tion had a different function: tracking and confirming liquidation priori-
ties. The modifications, however, made in 1978, and to some extent in
1984, would change how classification was used.
III. COURTS, CLASSIFICATION, AND GERRYMANDERING
A. Restating the Obvious: Why Classification is Important
Classification allows a plan proponent to rewrite non-bankruptcy
priorities within the bankruptcy priority scheme. Since a plan accepted by
all classes can be confirmed even if it violates absolute priority, this ability
to mold classes is powerful. Initially, a plan proponent has the opportu-
nity, under the right circumstances, to overwhelm objecting parties by in-
cluding them in a class filled with sympathetic creditors. Unlike previous
bankruptcy practice, dissenting creditors cannot assert violations of abso-
lute priority if the class in which they belong, or have been placed, votes
in favor of the plan.
This inability to complain highlights a concept worth some elabora-
tion. Classification does not exist in a vacuum. There must be a plan
containing the classification. The ultimate question is not whether a plan
contains classification which is permissible, for bad classification presuma-
bly can be waived, but whether the plan can be confirmed. Thus, looking
at classification without also looking at the plan that contains the classifi-
9.02[l], at 9-8.
" Many courts recognize this. See, e.g., John Hancock Life Ins. Co. v. Route 37 Business Park
Assoc. (In re Route 37 Business Park Assoc.), 987 F.2d 154, 158 (3d Cir. 1993) ("Section 1122(a)
does not expressly provide that 'substantially similar' claims may not be placed in separate classes.");
Hanson v. First Bank of South Dakota (In re Hanson), 828 F.2d 1310, 1313 (8th Cir. 1987) ("We
agree that 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) does not prohibit the placement of substantially similar claims in
different classes."); In re Jersey City Medical Ctr., 817 F.2d 1055, 1060-61 (3d Cir. 1987) ("The
express language of this statute explicitly forbids a plan from placing dissimilar claims in the same
class; it does not, though, address the presence of similar claims in different classes .... [W]e agree
with the general view which permits the grouping of similar claims in different classes."); Teamsters
Nat'l Freight Indus. Negotiating Comm. v. United States Truck Co. (In re United States Truck Co.),
800 F.2d 581, 584-86 (6th Cir. 1986) (confirming a chapter 11 plan in an operating case which
classified union claims separately from other general unsecured claims).
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cation provides only a small part of the story.
Plan proponents often structure their classes to ensure confirmation
of the plan. Even if no class consented to the proposed plan, the original
text of the Code permitted confirmation so long as the plan itself was
"fair and equitable" and did not "unfairly discriminate" against non-con-
senting classes. 4
B. Section 1129(aX1O) and "Real" Classes of Creditors
This remained the state of the law until 1984 when Congress
adopted the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984
(BAFJA).7 5 As part of BAFJA, Congress added section 1129(a)(1 0).76
This section provides that, even in cramdown, at least one impaired class
of non-insider creditors must accept the plan. This provision requires
some independent validation of the plan; insiders are not counted when
determining whether this confirmation requirement is met.77
Section 1129(a)(10) thus introduced novel considerations into the
strategy of claim classification. Rather than attempting to use classifica-
tion to overwhelm dissenters, plan proponents began to use it to isolate
support. The prototypical situation is that of the real estate debtor with an
undersecured creditor. In that situation, the amount of the deficiency
claim usually dwarfs all other debts. Therefore, unless separate classifica-
tion is possible, no plan can be confirmed without the secured creditor's
approval. "
74 Until 1984, it was theoretically possible to confirm a plan without the consent of any class of
impaired creditors. This followed the disputed proposition that chapter XII had sanctioned such re-
suits. See Rusch, Gerrymandering and Classification, supra note 7, at 190-91; 9 COLLIER ON BANK-
RUPTCY 8.12, at 1080 (14th ed. 1978).
75 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353 (1984).
76 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (1988). Professor Rusch reviews the legislative history of
§ 1129(a)(10) in Rusch, Gerrymandering and Classification, supra note 7, at 186-89. See also Carl-
son, supra note 7, at 577-82.
77 See S. REP. No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (1983) ("Paragraph (10) makes clear the intent
of § 1129(a)(10) that one 'real' class of creditors must vote for the plan of reorganization."). See also
S. REP. No. 150, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1981).
78 See Windsor on the River Assocs. Ltd. v. Balcor Real Estate Fin., Inc. (In re Windsor on the
River Assocs. Ltd.), 7 F.3d 127, 132-33 (8th Cir. 1993). See also my discussion of it in Bruce A.
Markell, Eighth Circuit Rule "SAD" News for Single-Asset Cases, NORTON BANtR. L. ADV. 1
(Dec. 1993). Indeed, the National Bankruptcy Conference has suggested the repeal of § 1129(a)(10).
National Bankruptcy Conference, Reforming The Bankruptcy Code: The National Bankruptcy Con-
ference's Bankruptcy Code Review Project Final Report, May 1, 1994 at 276-77 (1994).
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C. Classification and the Courts
Since 1984, courts have read section 1122 through the lens of section
1129(a)(10). They often examine a plan proponent's motives in separately
classifying claims, and if that classification serves only to provide a con-
senting class, the classification is struck down before confirmation. Use of
terms such as "gerrymandering""9 and "artificial impairment" are liber-
ally sprinkled through these opinions.80
While these cases may reach the result anticipated by the Code, they
do so for the wrong reason. This can be seen from a short examination of
cases construing section 1122, which break into roughly two groups: real
estate cases which involve single-asset debtors and those which do not.
The single-asset debtors, or SADs, 1 have generated the most litigation."
1. Of "SADs"-Singe-Asset Debtors-And Other Real Estate Woes
In SAD reorganizations, every senior lender has a significant and
credible strategy. It can propose a liquidation plan or a reorganization
plan that is relatively easy to implement: sell the property and then dis-
tribute all proceeds in accordance with non-bankruptcy priorities. Even in
the event of stalemate and dismissal, the lender still receives the same as it
would under a liquidating plan.
Debtors (or, more accurately, debtors' principals) then scramble to
salvage their investment, employing everything from "new value" plans to
plans containing harsh non-market terms. Without section 1129(a)(10),
The definitive origins of gerrymandering are set forth in Carlson, supra note 7, at 565-66.
So See, e.g., Boston Post Rd. Ltd. Partnership v. FDIC (In re Boston Post Rd. Ltd. Partner-
ship), 21 F.3d 477, 481 & 483 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3192, 1994 Westlaw
512684 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1995) (No. 94-442); John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Route 37 Business
Park Assocs., 987 F.2d 154, 158 (3d Cir. 1993); Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Grystone III Joint
Venture (In re Greystone III Joint Venture), 995 F.2d 1274, 1279 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 72 (1992) ("[T]hou shalt not classify similar claims differently in order to gerrymander an
affirmative vote on a reorganization plan."); In re Bloomingdale Partners, 1994 Westlaw 443684, 25
Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1544 (Bankr. N.D. Ill., Aug. 15, 1994); Meltzer, supra note 7.
"1 SADs are entities, usually partnerships, which own one asset, usually an apartment complex
or other income producing real property. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(51B) (definition of "single asset real
estate"), added by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 218, 108 Stat. 3146
(October 22, 1994). The combination of investment tax credits, depreciation, and various other non-
cash charges to income with the pass-through nature of partnership taxation (not to mention govern-
ment subsidy of the residential real estate market), make SADs an attractive investment opportunity.
The roller-coaster nature of the real estate market, however, often converts these investment opportu-
nities into bankruptcy problems.
as An excellent analysis of the problems caused by single-asset debtors is contained in Krause,
supra note 7.
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they could respond with a competing cramdown plan, with the bank-
ruptcy judge and section 1129(c) deciding the outcome. Section
1129(a)(10), however, requires them to find or carve out separate im-
paired classes to approve the plan.
What is the role of section 1122 in this scuffle? It only tells us when
we cannot combine claims; it is silent as to when we may separate them."3
The natural reaction to this is to classify separately the lender's deficiency
claim, leaving all other unsecured creditors in a different class. There is
nothing in the statute preventing this classification. Since the issue is one
of separation rather than combination, the statute is silent. Presumably,
this silence permits actions not expressly prohibited. 4
The situation is further complicated by those provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Code which alter non-bankruptcy priorities. In the real estate con-
text in particular, chapter 11 converts non-recourse deficiencies, which
take nothing outside of bankruptcy, into regular unsecured deficiency
claims, which do take something inside bankruptcy. 5 Thus, debtors have
attempted to separately classify non-recourse deficiencies in order to create
the elusive accepting impaired class from the remaining unsecured
creditors.""
Until recently, most of these attempts failed. The Second, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits have held such separate classification
to be impermissible from among the remaining unsecured creditors.8 7 The
Fifth Circuit stated its objection cleanly: "thou shalt not classify similar
11 Recall that § 77B and chapter X permitted, but did not mandate, that deficiency claims could
be classified with other unsecured claims. Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, 48 Stat. 911, 915 (§ 77B)
(repealed 1938); 11 U.S.C. § 597 (chapter X) (repealed 1979).
" See Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 112 S. Ct. 1146 (1992) (By not explicitly amending
non-bankruptcy jurisdictional statutes to deny ability to appeal interlocutory orders from district court
orders, Congress could not be held to preclude such appeals implicitly through enactment of a scheme
specifically dealing with bankruptcy appeals and which precluded such jurisdiction).
:5 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (1988).
a For a compelling argument that separate classification is mandatory when the debtor's general
partner is sufficiently solvent to pay trade claims, see Carlson, supra note 7.
87 Boston Post Road Ltd. Partnership v. FDIC (In re Boston Post Road Ltd. Partnership), 21
F.3d 477, 483 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3192, 1994 Westlaw 512684 (U.S. Jan. 17,
1995) (No. 94-442); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Route 37 Business Park Assocs., 987 F.2d
154, 161-62 (3d Cir. 1993); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bryson Properties, XVIII (In re Bryson Properties,
XVIII), 961 F.2d 496, 502 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 191 (1992); Lumber Exch. Bldg. Ltd.
Partnership v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. (In re Lumber Exch. Bldg. Ltd. Partnership), 968 F.2d 647,
649-50 (8th Cir. 1992); Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Greystone III Joint Venture (In re Greystone
III Joint Venture), 995 F.2d 1274, 1281 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 72 (1992). The
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit also agrees. Oxford Life Ins. Co. v. Tuscon Self-
Storage, Inc. (In re Tuscon Self-Storage, Inc.), 166 B.R. 892 (Bankr. 9th 1994).
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claims differently in order to gerrymander an affirmative vote on a reor-
ganization plan."88
John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Route 37 Business
Park Associates presents an illustrative analysis.89 In John Hancock, the
debtor attempted to justify separate classification based on the different
treatment of the non-recourse deficiency under state law.90 The court gave
two basic responses, neither of which is entirely satisfactory. In rejecting
separate classification, the court asserted that permitting separate classifi-
cation would disenfranchise the non-recourse creditor." The court also
noted that, regardless of the status under non-bankruptcy law, bankruptcy
law equalizes the status on liquidation of unsecured claims and non-re-
course deficiency claims. 2
As to the first point, only a myopic view of bankruptcy law would
see the partially-secured creditor as disenfranchised. Initially, such a claim
holder has, and will receive a full distribution in respect of, its secured
claim. Receipt of this distribution would be the most that a creditor could
expect under non-bankruptcy law or in a chapter 7 liquidation. Second,
even if other creditors accept the plan, the plan proponent can confirm
over the dissent of the separately segregated deficiency only if the treat-
ment of that deficiency is "fair and equitable" and not unduly discrimina-
tory." In short, no junior class can participate and no equal class can
unfairly improve its claim. Finally, unless there are no other creditors-in
which case dismissal for a lack of a good faith filing might be appropriate
-lumping a large, bankruptcy-manufactured claim with unsecured credi-
tors whose claims are not dependent on the chapter of the Code providing
relief to the debtor, effectively disenfranchises the smaller creditors.
As to the second point, no one doubts that section 1111(b) stops the
debtor from disallowing the deficiency portion of a non-recourse claim in
chapter 11.9" The limits of this assertion, however, must be examined.
First,, as noted above, if the case is dismissed or converted to one under
chapter 7,95 section 1111(b) does not apply. Section 502(b)(1) permits a
" Greystone IIl Joint Venture, 995 F.2d at 1279. An excellent and comprehensive review of all
cases in this area can be found in Krause, supra note 7.
OE 987 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1993).
90 Id. at 159-60.
91 Id. at 161-62.
92 Id. at 161.
93 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (1988).
11 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (1988). If it were not for § 1111(b), § 502(b)(1) would allow estates to
disallow any recovery on a deficiency arising in connection with a non-recourse claim.
"' A conversion may occur "for cause." 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (1988). If the case is converted to
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representative of the estate to disallow the creditor's claim for a deficiency
because non-bankruptcy law would not recognize it."8 Second, this limited
life - only in chapter 11 is the deficiency claim recognized - is inten-
tional and integral to the section 1111(b) election. The purpose of that
election is to strike a balance between a non-recourse secured lender and
the debtor. Although the secured creditor is saved from losing its defi-
ciency claim due to the bankruptcy discharge, in return it must elect to
have its entire claim treated as secured. In short, the secured lender gains
secured treatment for the full amount of its debt, but loses the right to
participate in the plan as an unsecured creditor.
Prohibiting separate classification for creditors who have not made
the election - that is, who are willing to risk a discharge of the deficiency
claim - gives the secured creditor more than Congress provided. The
"cmore" is an effective veto over reorganization proceedings through con-
trol of at least two classes - the main secured class, and the class of
unsecured creditors. I use the term "veto" because section 1129(a)(10)
precludes the debtor from even proposing "fair and equitable" treatment
of the separately classified deficiency. 97 If Congress had wanted to elimi-
nate all single-asset real estate cases from chapter 11, it could have elected
to do so but it did not.98 The cases on separate classification, however,
achieve by judicial interpretation what Congress did not say in the statute.
This view may change. The Seventh Circuit, after explicitly review-
ing most of the circuit cases noted above, recently permitted separate clas-
sification of unsecured deficiency claims.9 Specifically, the Seventh Cir-
cuit stated that "we cannot accept the proposition implicit in Greystone
one under chapter 7, the effect is as if the original petition sought relief under chapter 7. 11 U.S.c.
§ 348(d) (1988).
- 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) (1988).
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (1988).
" Section 362(d)(3), added by § 218(b) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, see supra note
81, purports to apply tougher standards to single asset real estate debtors. For example, it provides for
faster and more focused relief from the stay. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3) (1994). It exempts these new
relief measures, however, in those cases in which "the debtor has filed a plan of reorganization that
has a reasonable possibility of being confirmed within a reasonable time." Id. at § 362(d)(3)(A). As
stated in the legislative history, "[t]his amendment will ensure that the automatic stay provision is not
abused, while giving the debtor the opportunity to create a workable plan of reorganization." S. REP.
No. 168, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1993).
" In re Woodbrook Assocs., 19 F.3d 312, 317-19 (7th Cir. 1994). Woodbrook has had a gener-
ally favorable reception. See Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Baldwin Park Towne Ctr., Ltd. (In re
Baldwin Park Towne Ctr., Ltd.), 171 B.R. 374 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1994); LW-SP2, L.P. v. Krisch
Realty Assocs., L.P. (In re Krisch Realty Assocs., L.P.), 1994 Westlaw 668012 (Bankr. W. D. Va.,
Oct. 25, 1994). But see In re Barney and Carey Co., 170 B.R. 17 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994).
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that separate classification of a section 1111(b) claim is nearly conclusive
evidence of a debtor's intent to gerrymander an affirmative vote for
confirmation." 00
The Seventh Circuit's analysis focused on section 1129(a)(7), the so-
called "best interests of creditors" test that requires that each creditor re-
ceive as much as it would receive in a chapter 7 liquidation.101 Non-re-
course deficiencies, however, receive nothing in a chapter 7. Therefore,
because section 1123(a)(4) requires the same treatment for each class
member,1 0 2 requiring the debtor to classify a non-recourse deficiency
claim with other unsecured claims effectively bootstraps a non-recourse
lender's minimum recovery to that of a regular unsecured creditor.
The following example illustrates this result. Suppose that a simpli-
fied debtor has three creditors, two of which are owed $100, and one of
which is owed $102. The two owed $100 have full recourse against the
debtor and are unsecured while the third holds a non-recourse claim se-
cured by property now worth one dollar. Although the debtor's business
will liquidate for $201, it has a going concern value of $298. In a chapter
7 bankruptcy, the non-recourse lender would take one dollar, and the two
full recourse creditors would each get $100. The debtor would take
nothing.
If the parties wish to preserve the going concern surplus, the value in
excess of $201, they will attempt to reorganize under chapter 11. This
strategy, however, is problematic. If the holdings from Phoenix Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Greystone III Joint Venture (In re Greystone III
Joint Venture),103 and John Hancock are followed, then the non-recourse
creditor's $101 deficiency 04 will have to be classified with the two re-
course creditor claims. This creates a class of $301 of unsecured claims,
and the non-recourse creditor gets its one dollar in security. Since section
1123(a)(4) requires all class members to be treated alike,10 5 each member
will receive approximately ninety-nine dollars.1 0 6
100 19 F.3d at 318.
101 Id. at 319.
102 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4) (1988).
103 995 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 72 (1992).
104 Due to the disparity between the amount of the debt and the value of the collateral, I assume
that the non-recourse creditor will not make the § 1111(b) election. It will thus have two claims in
the reorganization: one secured claim in the amount of one dollar, and one unsecured claim in the
amount of $101.
205 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4) (1988).
100 If all of the going concern surplus is allocated to creditors, the dividend is 98.67%. As a
result, the recourse creditors will receive $98.67 in property in satisfaction of their claims, and the
[Vol. 11
Claim Classification
The recourse creditors, however, will not accept the ninety-nine dol-
lars because it is less than their liquidation dividend of $100. Thus, they
could each block confirmation under section 1129(a)(7). On the other
hand, if the non-recourse creditor does not receive at least ninety-nine
dollars, it can block consensual confirmation since it holds more than one-
third (101/301, or 33.55%) of the claims in the class.
This kind of dispute looks much more like an inter-class dispute than
an intra-class concern.107 Separate classification would better represent
the bargaining position outside of chapter 11, since it would recognize the
steeper downside to the obdurant lender.
Taking this situation into account, the Seventh Circuit further noted
that section 1111(b) anticipates separate classification. '0  In the case of a
widely-held secured class, such as a class of secured, non-recourse, bond-
holders, section 1111(b) allows the class to choose whether it wants to be
secured for the full amount of the debt or whether it wants to have a
bifurcated claim. As a result, classifying regular unsecured creditors with
the non-recourse deficiency claims gives unsecured creditors a vote on
matters which either are irrelevant to them or which are none of their
business.'0 9
2. All Other Creditors
What about other creditors - including secured creditors - whose
deficiencies would be recognized under non-bankruptcy law? Obviously,
this presents a different matter. Since such creditors must share in any
value remaining after satisfaction of secured creditors, a different justifica-
tion for separately classifying a deficiency claim must exist. The cases up-
holding separate classification of regular unsecured claims offer some
guidance. The cases seem to embrace a notion that separate classification
can occur if the segregated class has non-creditor motives." 0
non-recourse creditor will receive $99.66, for a total allocation of $297.
107 There is an escape hatch. Section 1123(a)(4) allows a member of a class to elect to take "less
favorable" treatment than that given to the rest of the class. This option, however, leads to an odd
plan. It would offer $100 to each creditor with a side arrangement that the non-recourse creditor
would take "less favorable" treatment. There are, however, problems with feasibility if the plan calls
for payments of $300 when the going concern value is only $298.
o In re Woodbrook Assocs., 19 F.3d 312, 318-19 (7th Cir. 1994).
I00 d. See also In re SM 104 Ltd., 160 B.R. 202, 219-21 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993).
11 See, e.g., Steelcase Inc. v. Johnston (In re Johnston), 21 F.3d 323, 327-28 (9th Cir. 1994)
(proper to separately classify an unsecured claim which is being hotly disputed in separate litigation);
Frito-Lay, Inc. v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 10 F.3d 944, 956-57 (2d Cir. 1993)
(finding separate classification of tax lessors based upon whether they independently provided debtor
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For now, it is sufficient to say that differential classification of un-
secured claims occurs frequently. I discuss later why such cases are com-
mon, but first I discuss the reasons why it is desirable to distinguish
among such unsecured claims.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR CHAPTER 11 CLASSIFICATION
There are several practical justifications for differential classification.
Creditors who have alternate forms of payment - such as third party
guaranties - have different incentives with respect to their claims against
the debtor."' Also, creditors who view the debtor as a valuable vendor or
customer have more of an interest in the continuation of the debtor than
do one-time tort victims of the debtor. Chapters XI and XII of the Bank-
ruptcy Act recognized these distinctions, permitting "division of [un-
secured] debts into classes and the treatment thereof in different ways or
upon different terms." '12
As Jeffrey Krause has noted," 3 the taint of SADs has infected and
called into question this practical knowledge. In order to return classifica-
tion to its proper role, I suggest the following construction of section
1122,114 the section of the Code governing classification: courts should
permit any classification proposed by a chapter 11 plan unless a dissenter
can establish that the challenged classification would combine, to the dis-
senter's detriment, creditors or shareholders with different non-bank-
ruptcy liquidation priorities. In cases meeting this test, the claims would
fail the "substantially similar" requirement in section 1122. Detriment
could be established if the plan transfers property or value preserved by
the reorganization from the class in which the dissenter has been placed to
another class having a different non-bankruptcy liquidation priority."'
in possession financing); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Route 37 Business Park Assocs., 987
F.2d 154, 159 (3d Cir. 1993) (approving and explaining In re Jersey City Medical Ctr., 817 F.2d
1055, 1061 (3d Cir. 1987), in which separate classification of medical malpractice tort claims, non-
priority pension claims, and trade creditors was upheld); Heartland Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Briscoe Enter., Ltd., II (In re Briscoe Enter., Ltd., I), 994 F.2d 1160, 1167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 550 (1993) (upholding separate classification in single-asset real estate case of city which
contributed cash to subsidize rentals in moderate to low income housing); Teamsters Nat'l Freight
Indus. Negotiating Comm. v. United States Truck Co. (In re United States Truck Co.), 800 F.2d
581, 587 (6th Cir. 1986) (upholding separate classification of labor union based on such entity's "non-
creditor" interests in reorganization).
.. COLLIER, supra note 33, 1 9.10, at 1604.
"' Bankruptcy Act §§ 357(1), 461(3) (repealed 1979).
113 See Krause, supra note 7.
"' 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (1988).
115 At least one bankruptcy court has adopted a standard of classification consistent with this
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A. The Test Expanded
The proposed test focuses on two related issues: the plan's proposed
classification and the effect of that classification on a dissenting creditor or
interest holder. A plan's effect is measured by determining whether the
plan takes advantage of the Code's innovation of allowing transfers of
value between classes having different non-bankruptcy liquidation priori-
ties. The concepts are explored below.
1. Of Plans and Classification
Classification cannot exist separately from the plan in which it is
contained. In assessing the validity of a classification, the focus should
thus be on the plan itself. Since all plans must classify claims,116 the
switch from examining classification to examining plans is relatively triv-
ial. The switch does require, however, adoption of the proposition that
even theoretically bad classification, such as the combination of secured
and unsecured claims, does not provide grounds for objection unless the
plan's treatment of a particular claim supplies a separate substantive rea-
son for objection.
This can be illustrated by example. Suppose a plan's primary pur-
pose is to restructure its equity interests. 17 In line with this purpose, all
claims are classified together, regardless of non-bankruptcy priority and
the claims are paid in full, with interest, within ninety days after confir-
mation. In this example, it would be odd, or at least practically meaning-
less, to allow a creditor to object to classification of claims.
For these reasons, I propose that although the plan proponent bears
the burden of obtaining confirmation," 8 the creditor should bear the bur-
den of demonstrating impermissible classification. For the most part, since
the proposed test is fairly permissive, violations will be easy to assert and
prove. Creditors will be able to tell from the required disclosure docu-
test. See, e.g., In re ZRM-Oklahoma Partnership, 156 B.R. 67, 70-71 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1993).
n 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(1) (1988).
1 See, e.g., Stolrow v. Stolrow's, Inc. (In re Stolrow's, Inc.), 84 B.R. 167 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1988) (consistent with good faith for solvent debtor to file to resolve difference among owners); In re
Gagel & Gagel, 24 B.R. 671, 674 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982) (consistent with good faith for solvent
debtor to file to restructure secured debts only).
"' Heartland Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Briscoe Enter., Ltd., II (In re Briscoe Enter., Ltd.,
II), 994 F.2d 1160, 1164-65 (5th Cir. 1993); In re Investors Fla. Aggressive Growth Fund, Ltd., 168
B.R. 760, 765 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1994); In re Westwood Plaza Apartments, 147 B.R. 692, 698
(Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1992); In re MCorp Financial, Inc., 137 B.R. 219, 225 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1992).
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ments119 that the plan combines them with creditors having different liq-
uidation priorities. Creditors will also be able to discern whether lower
priority participants will receive under the plan property in excess of their
chapter 7 liquidation entitlement.12 Any payment of this excess would
thus represent a forced sharing of the going concern surplus among par-
ticipants having different liquidation priorities. 121 If the plan proposes
such sharing, detriment to the objecting creditor can be shown because the
plan proponent is skewing the vote away from the baseline priorities.
Consequently, if any class combines participants having claims of equal
priority with participants having lower priority claims, a dissenting credi-
tor can establish improper classification.
What would be accomplished by this? Assume that a plan classifies
accrued dividends on preferred stock with unsecured trade claims. Assume
further that under applicable non-bankruptcy law, accrued but unpaid
dividends have a lower liquidation priority than trade claims; that is,
trade claims must be paid in full before any payment is made on the
dividends. Dissenting trade creditors could successfully attack this classifi-
cation by arguing that the plan proponent is using the greater numbers
and values of lower priority dividend claims to rob trade creditors of value
that is theirs under the absolute priority rule.122 A debtor cannot mix the
claims having different non-bankruptcy priorities as tools for allocating
reorganization value.
2. Of Non-Bankruptcy Priorities
The test focuses on non-bankruptcy priorities. Historically, these pri-
orities have been the baseline for bankruptcy distributions, unless they
contravene some federal interest.1 23 Section 726 codifies these priorities as
a general guideline for liquidation.1 24 It assumes pro rata distribution to
all unsecured claims except to the extent that the claims have special pri-
119 Under the Code, any plan proponent must provide creditors and shareholders with informa-
tion relevant to their decision to accept or reject a plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (1988).
120 Section 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) states that a creditor cannot receive less under a chapter 11 reor-
ganization plan than it would under a chapter 7 liquidation. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (1988).
... See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
122 Section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) provides that a dissenting creditor may insist that a creditor with a
lower priority not receive any property until the dissenting creditor is paid. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1988). This is commonly known as the absolute priority rule.
12 See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979). Some non-bankruptcy priorities are
suspended during bankruptcy. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3713 (1988) (giving debts owed to the United
States priority over all other debts except in the case of federal bankruptcy proceedings).
2 4 11 U.S.C. § 726(a) (1988).
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ority under section 507125 The absolute priority rule, another restriction
on distributions, has its origins in state fraudulent transfer law.126
The Code also deals with the interactions of classification and the
priority rules set forth in section 507. Section 1123(a)(1) specifically pro-
hibits classification of certain types of bankruptcy priority claims.1 2 7
These include administrative, wage and tax claims. 28 Section 1123, thus,
prohibits, for example, the dilution of administrative trade claims with
pre-petition trade claims, or the marginalization of unsecured tax claims
by insider debt claims.129
3. Of Detriment: The Involuntary Transfer of Reorganization Value
Among Classes
Under the "democracy" aspect of reorganization, the validity of clas-
sification was secondary to the general preferences of the creditor body.
The test I propose attempts to take this into account by allowing a credi-
tor to successfully attack suspect classification only if it shows detriment.
Detriment, in this sense, accounts for the purpose of classifica-
tion-regulating transfers of the going concern surplus among classes hav-
ing mixed liquidation priorities.
As previously indicated,"3 ' the going concern surplus is that amount
of a debtor's value that contributes to its continued operation. Chapter 11
is based on the idea that this value should be preserved for the benefit of
creditors and interest holders.131 This is evident not only from legislative
history and cases construing chapter 11,132 but also from the operation of
section 1129(a)(7). Section 1129(a)(7) requires a plan proponent to
demonstrate that each participant, not each class of participants, receive at
least as much in reorganization as it would in liquidation. 3 Unless there
is something more to allocate after the liquidation allocation, chapter 11
has little meaning.
125 11 U.S.C. § 726(b) (1988) (pro-rata requirement). Section 726(a)(1) provides that the first
level of distributions should go to claims having priority under § 507. Section 507(a)(1), in turn,
directs that administrative expenses under § 503(b) have first priority under § 507.
226 See Markell, Owners, Auctions, supra note 35, at 74-77.
127 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(1) (1988). This practice harkens back to the 1884 Massachusetts com-
position provisions.
126 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a) (1988 & Supp. I 1990); 503(a) (1988).
129 11 U.S.C. § 1123 (1988).
:30 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
121 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
112 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
133 See supra note 12.
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The role of classification in this context is to facilitate the ongoing
negotiation over the division of the going concern surplus. This includes
the division within the class or classes of creditors, which was the historic
function, and among classes having different non-bankruptcy liquidation
priorities, the innovation of the Code in 1978."4 This negotiation has
many facets. Creditors and equity holders may have different views on the
value of the debtor, the worth of their claims and entitlements, and the
risks presented by extended repayment schedules. Classification allows a
plan proponent to segment the participants in such a way that while forc-
ing the plan proponent to satisfy the court that each participant will re-
ceive an amount equal to liquidation entitlement, requires only a demon-
stration that a majority of each class has agreed on the division of the
going concern surplus.
If, however, a properly constituted class dissents, there are manifold
protections. For example, section 1129(b) requires that for any plan to be
confirmed over the objection of a class, the plan must be "fair and equita-
ble" and must not "unfairly discriminate" against the dissenting class. 13 5
Moreover, confirmation requires that the plan proponent act in good
faith,"'6 provide each creditor at least the liquidation value of its claim, 187
and prove that the reorganization plan proposed is economically
feasible."'
These requirements are powerful protections for dissenters. They de-
mand that the plan proponent comply with absolute priority as to the
dissenting class, and provide acceptable explanations for any differential
treatment given to that class. Good faith requires the plan proponent to
'" See Rusch, Gerrymandering and Classification, supra note 7, at 196-206. A question which
could be fruitfully explored is whether, under game theory, the Code reaches sensible results with this
initial allocation of leverage. See Douglas G. Baird & Randal C. Picker, A Simple Noncooperative
Bargaining Model of Corporate Reorganizations, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 311 (1991); Claire Finkelstein,
Note, Financial Distress as a Noncooperative Game: A Proposal for Overcoming Obstacles to Pri-
vate Workouts, 102 YALE L.J. 2205 (1993).
135 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (1988). See Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Baldwin Park Towne
Ctr., Ltd. (In re Baldwin Park Towne Ctr., Ltd.), 1994 Westlaw 484456 (Bankr. C.D. Cal., Aug. 2,
1994).
The origins of this protection are in § 77 relating to railroad reorganizations. "The section pro-
vides that where two-thirds of a class of creditors accept the plan, then the plan is binding upon that
particular class of creditors and the minority must accept the new securities issued under the plan of
reorganization. This is fair because all the minority of a particular class should expect is that a fair
and equitable plan be devised and if the plan is fair then all they are entitled to is equal participation
in the new securities." H. REP. No. 1897, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1933).
136 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (1988). See also FED. R. BANKR P. 3020.
" 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (1988).
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (1988).
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proceed in a manner consistent with the purposes of reorganization. In
other words, the dissenting class must be paid in full if any junior class
retains any interest, and the payment terms of what is received must be
near or equal to what other classes of equal non-bankruptcy priorities are
receiving. 139
What protects, however, dissenting creditors in accepting classes?
Protecting these types of creditors is the true role of classification. Implicit
in chapter 11 is the notion that while liquidation priorities are sacro-
sanct,140 the allocation of the going concern surplus is not. That view is
historic, tracing back to Scottish, English, and Massachusetts insolvency
and bankruptcy acts of the Nineteenth century. 4
The Code also adopted this view in its structuring and voting provi-
sions; allocation of the going concern surplus is accomplished by creditor
consensus. But since it is wasteful to specify each participant's treatment
individually, classification is one way to designate distributions collec-
tively, and to use that grouping to obtain consent to the plan. Since we
honor state law priorities in the case of dissent, classification performs a
gateway or threshold function for application of the absolute priority rule
as modified in 1978. It ensures that a group's acceptance of treatment is
not obtained at the expense of warping non-bankruptcy liquidation
preferences.
In short, classification recognizes that a debtor's creditor body is often
composed of many different types of claims, each of which may possess
different non-bankruptcy priorities. Moreover, the membership in any one
group may not be exclusive; equity holders, for example, often extend
credit to their company; secured claims often have associated unsecured
"I Against this background, the cases under § 1129(a)(10) which refer to "gerrymandering"
and "artificial" classification seem to have jumped the gun. They use classification as a substantive
requirement; that is, that classification must serve an ongoing business purpose other than simply
obtaining confirmation. This is making the one consenting class rule do too much. It only seeks to
block plans which have no creditor support even though they comply with the fair and equitable rules.
The "real" class of creditors referred to in the legislative history are creditors who are "really" taking
some discount on their claim; that is, those creditors whose treatment makes them impaired within the
meaning of § 1124.
Add to these arguments the fact that the § 1129(a)(10) classes lead to absurd or contradictory
results and one sees that courts have missed the boat. Sections 1122 and 1129(a)(10) require an
almost mechanical construction. First, test whether non-bankruptcy liquidation priorities have been
combined. If not, see if at least one accepting, non-insider class has had their non-bankruptcy claim
alerted in any respect. If yes, then the dissenters within accepting classes must accept the plan treat-
ment, and dissenting classes can only look to § 1129(b) for grounds to object.
140 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (1988).
"" See supra notes 17-25.
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deficiencies. The prevailing function of classification is to ensure that
these chance concordances of status do not influence plan treatment.
How is this tested? Under the proposed test, a court will look at
whether the acceptance of a class is tainted by affirmative votes of credi-
tors in that class whose claims or interests have lower non-bankruptcy
liquidations priorities. If a court determines that the acceptance is tainted,
then the classification is improper because the plan proponent has used
classification to allocate reorganization value across the boundaries of non-
bankruptcy liquidation priorities.
B. The Proposed Test and Current Cases on Statutory Construction
The proposed test is also faithful to the Supreme Court's current
views of the proper statutory interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code.
Before analyzing this, recall that the Bankruptcy Code stands more or less
alone among federal statutes. Construction of its terms is left almost ex-
clusively to the courts; no administrative agency exists which studies and
applies its expertise to the meaning of the Code's provisions."" Tax stat-
utes, for example, receive scrutiny and review by the Treasury Depart-
ment; environmental statutes are the provenance of the Environmental
Protection Agency; and banking and other financial statutes are reviewed
by the Federal Trade Commission and the Comptroller of the Currency,
among others.
Partly because of this anomaly, the Supreme Court has issued a se-
ries of statutory interpretation cases involving the Code. While the cases
are not completely consistent, many take a "plain meaning" approach to
the Code. 4 A summary of this approach might state that the current
members of the Court start afresh with the language in question, and then
142 Under the Bankruptcy Act, the Securities and Exchange Commission was involved in many
chapter X cases, and solicitation of its views was mandatory (with adoption of them being advisory) in
all cases in which the scheduled indebtedness exceeded $3,000,000. Bankruptcy Act § 172, 11 U.S.C.
§ 572 (repealed 1979).
113 Of the eighteen Supreme Court bankruptcy cases decided between 1990 and 1993, it is ex-
tremely difficult to find any consistent thread or overarching principles. Bruce A. Markell, Conspir-
acy, Literalism and Ennui at the Supreme Court: An Examination of Bankruptcy Cases Decided
From 1990 to 1993, 41 FED. B. NEWS & J. 174 (1994). Others have drawn similar conclusions. As
Thomas Kelch recently wrote:
It cannot be denied that textualist interpretation presently dominates the imagery of Su-
preme Court treatment of bankruptcy issues. Even this rhetoric, however, is not consistent.
It is vague. It is fragmentary. It is not homogeneous. It is not a "theory" at all. It is a
muffled and ill-defined echo of a concept not deserving of the name.
Thomas G. Kelch, An Apology for Plain Meaning Interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code, 10
BANKR. DEV. J. 289, 300 (1994).
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attempt to apply that language consistent with what they believe to be its
proper context. Just what constitutes a proper context is debatable; it
seems to range from individual Justices' perceptions unaided by anything
other than case law, to legislative history and other statements that might
bear on the issue. The Court does seem unwilling, however, to limit con-
struction of the Code simply because Congress may not have considered
the full ramifications of its word choice."" It also seems satisfied with
allowing broad Code provisions to stand.145
With this background, any analysis of the proper construction of
claim classification should start with section 1122. That section states, in
full:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a plan may place a
claim or an interest in a particular class only if such claim or interest is
substantially similar to the other claims or interests of such class.
(b) A plan may designate a separate class of claims consisting only of every
unsecured claim that is less than or reduced to an amount that the court
approves as reasonable and necessary for administrative convenience.146
Note that section 1122(a) states only a rule of exclusion - what cannot
244 See, e.g., Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. Partnership, 113 S. Ct. 1489, 1495
(1993) ("Courts properly assume, absent sufficient indication to the contrary, that Congress intends
the words in its enactments to carry 'their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.' ") (construing
Bankruptcy Rule 9006) (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)); Patterson v. Shu-
mate, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2246 (1992) ("Nothing in § 541 suggests that the phrase 'applicable nonban-
kruptcy law' refers, as petitioner contends, exclusively to state law. The text contains no limitation on
'applicable nonbankruptcy law' relating to the source of the law.") (construing Bankruptcy Code
§ 541); Union Bank v. Wolas, 112 S. Ct. 527, 531 (1991) ("The fact that Congress may not have
foreseen all of the consequences of a statutory enactment is not a sufficient reason for refusing to give
effect to its plain meaning.") (construing Bankruptcy Code § 547).
"' Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 112 S. Ct. 1644, 1648-49 (1992) (explaining that § 522(l)
requires the trustee in bankruptcy to object to debtor's claimed exemptions within 30 day period; there
is no implied exception for exemptions taken in bad faith or without any statutory justification);
Barnhill v. Johnson, 112 S. Ct. 1386, 1390 (1992) (holding that § 101(54) requires that a transfer is
made when a check is honored, not when it is delivered); Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 112 S.
Ct. 1146, 1150 (1992) (holding that bankruptcy jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 157(d), which gave
courts of appeals jurisdiction from appeals of final bankruptcy orders by district courts, does not affect
other avenues of appeal from district courts); Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 161 (1991) (holding
that § 109(d)'s silence on the business nature of debtor meant that individuals may file chapter 11
even if they are not engaged in business); Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 87 (1991)
(holding that lack of prohibition in the Bankruptcy Code regarding serial filings meant that debtors
may file a chapter 13 case to reorganize home mortgage payments after discharging their personal
liability in a chapter 7 case).
246 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (1988).
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be classified together.1 1 7 It does not state a rule of inclusion - what must
be classified together. This lack of explicit symmetry questions the rele-
vancy of section 1122 to the question of what claims must be classified
together. If in fact it is relevant, questions still exist as to what test section
1122 provides for such combinations.
While the Court has not addressed this issue directly, it has ex-
amined other Code provisions that do not completely cover their subject
matter." In Grogan v. Garner,14 9 for example, the Court addressed
whether pre-Code practice of assessing the dischargeability of a claim was
to be determined by a clear and convincing standard, or by a preponder-
ance of the evidence standard. 50 After noting that "[t]he language of
§ 523 does not prescribe the standard of proof for the discharge excep-
tions ,'5 the Court began its "inquiry into the appropriate burden of
proof under § 523 by examining the language of the statute and its legis-
lative history.""52 It found that the "legislative history of § 523 and its
predecessor, 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1976 ed.), is .. .silent," and "[t]his silence
is inconsistent with the view that Congress intended to require a special,
heightened standard of proof."153 It thus adopted the normal federal stan-
dard of preponderance of the evidence.
Similarly, in Connecticut National Bank v. Germain, T5 the Court
addressed the addition to the judicial code of a new section governing ap-
pellate jurisdiction in bankruptcy cases.15 5 The addition seemed to limit
the jurisdiction of circuit courts in appeals from interlocutory orders is-
sued by district courts who act as appellate judges in bankruptcy. The
problem was, however, that Congress did not also amend the general stat-
147 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (1988).
148 See Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 112 S. Ct. 1644, 1648-49 (1992) (holding that there is no
implied exception for exemptions under section 522(1) that are taken in bad faith or without statutory
justification); Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 112 S. Ct. 1146, 1149 (1992) (holding that it was
not the Court's place to close the avenue of appeal left open by 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)); Grogan v.
Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991) (holding that since § 523 did not specify a standard of proof, the
normal federal standard of preponderance of evidence should be used).
14 498 U.S. 279 (1991).
150 Id.
"I Id. at 286.
152 Id.
153 Id.
'5 112 S. Ct. 1146 (1992).
'55 Id. The statute at issue provided that "[t]he courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of ap-
peals from all final decisions, judgments, orders, and decrees entered under subsections (a) and (b) of
this section." 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988).
[Vol. 11
1995] Claim Classification
ute regulating interlocutory appeals from district courts, 56 thus leaving
open an avenue of appeal. 157 The Court refused to close this avenue, find-
ing that Congress knew how to close it if it wanted to do so. 5
Finally, in Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 5 9 the Court was faced
with section 522(l), which provided for a limited window for a trustee to
object to a debtor's claimed exemptions.1 6 The statute did not extend the
time for objection if the debtor took the exemptions in bad faith. Never-
theless, a number of lower courts had read such an exemption into the
statute.""1 The Court, however, refused to read a "bad faith" exception
into the debtor's ability to claim exemptions. It was not part of the text
chosen by Congress, and thus was not a requirement to be imposed, even
though it allowed relatively blatant exemptions to go unnoticed.6 2
These cases and others'63 indicate that the Court is not comfortable
reading additional terms into a statute. As the Court asserts each time the
issue is raised, "[w]here the statutory language is clear, our 'sole function.
is to enforce it according to its terms.' "164
108 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
157 112 S. Ct. at 1149.
158 Id. at 1149 (1992) ("We have stated time and again that courts must presume that a legisla-
ture says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.").
119 112 S. Ct. 1644 (1992).
160 Id. Section 522(i) provides that: "Unless a party in interest objects, the property claimed as
exempt on such list is exempt." 11 U.S.C. § 522(l) (1988).
101 See, e.g., Halverson v. Peterson (In re Peterson), 920 F.2d 1389, 1393-94 (8th Cir. 1990)
(holding that § 522(1) does provide for an extension of time when exemptions are filed in bad faith).
162 112 S. Ct. at 1648-49. The Court apparently saw the issue as one of its power, as opposed to
its discretion. As the Court explained, "Congress may enact comparable provisions to address the
difficulties that Taylor predicts will follow our decision. We have no authority to limit the application
of § 522(l) to exemptions claimed in good faith." Id.
1M3 See, e.g., Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 161 (1991) (holding that individuals may file
chapter 11 even if they are not engaged in business); Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 87
(1991) (holding that lack of prohibition in Bankruptcy Code regarding serial filings meant that debt-
ors may file a chapter 13 case to reorganize home mortgage payments after discharging their personal
liability in a chapter 7 case).
10 Rake v. Wade, 113 S. Ct. 2187, 2191 (1993 (construing § 1322 of the Code) (quoting
United States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (quoting Caminetti v. United States,
242 U.S. 470 (1917))). See also Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. Partnership, 113 S.
Ct. 1489, 1495 (1993) ("Courts properly assume, absent sufficient indication to the contrary, that
Congress intends the words in its enactments to carry 'their ordinary, contemporary, common mean-
ing.' ") (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) (construing "excusable neglect" in
rule governing filing of proofs of claim)); Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 779 (1992) ("Of course,
where the language is unambiguous, silence in the legislative history cannot be controlling.") (constru-
ing § 506 of the Bankruptcy Code); Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 162 (1991) ("First, this Court
has repeated with some frequency: 'Where, as here, the resolution of a question of federal law turns
on a statute and the intention of Congress, we look first to the statutory language and then to the
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Applying these cases to section 1122 is thus relatively easy. Section
1122(a) addresses only improper combinations of claims, not allegedly im-
proper segregation. It is silent on what claims "must" be classified to-
gether. According to the Supreme Court, this silence should be construed
as a lack of regulation of this aspect, precluding the interpolation of terms
such as "reasonable" or "rational" into the statute."6 5 The underlying as-
sumption here is that had Congress intended for such modifiers to be in-
serted, Congress would have placed them there.1
66
Examining section 1122(b)'s administrative convenience class excep-
tion leads to a similar result.'6 7 Some might interpret the statute's refer-
ence to "unsecured" claims to mean that classification by non-bankruptcy
priority is the norm and that this priority can only be varied by meeting
the requirements of reasonableness and necessity laid out in subsection
(b).
This argument, however, does not address the text of subsection (a)
which, regardless of subsection (b)'s text, does not refer to inclusion. 68
Moreover, subsection (b) is expressly excluded from (a), thus negating
legislative history if the statutory language is unclear.' ") (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886,
896 (1984)).
165 Many courts seem to permit separate classification only if the plan proponent can articulate
some reasonable or rational business or economic justification for doing so. Boston Post Rd. Ltd.
Partnership v. FDIC (In re Boston Post Rd. Ltd. Partnership), 21 F.3d 477, 483 (2d Cir. 1994);
Steel Case, Inc. v. Johnston (In re Johnston), 21 F.3d 323, 328 (9th Cir. 1994); Oxford Life Ins. Co.
v. Tucson Self-Storage, Inc. (In re Tucson Self-Storage, Inc.), 166 B.R. 892, 898 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1994). Under the Court's view of statutory interpetation, these considerations are no more important
than those which attempt to assess motivation when examining classification.
"' On this point, see Carlson, supra note 7, at 574.
167 See, e.g., Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Greystone III Joint Venture (In re Greystone III
Joint Venture), 995 F.2d 1274, 1278 (5th Cir. 1991) ("The broad interpretation of § 1122(a)
adopted by the lower courts would render § 1122(b) superfluous, a result that is anathema to elemen-
tary principles of statutory construction."); Washington Assocs. v. Citibank, N.A. (In re Washington
Assocs.), 147 B.R. 827, 830 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (quoting Greystone III Joint Venture, 995 F.2d at
1278).
168 As stated in In re Bloomingdale Partners, 170 B.R. 984, 989-90 (Bankr. N.D. II1. 1994):
Subsection (b) of § 1122 is not superfluous because it expressly authorizes the joint classi-
fication of claims that are not 'substantially similar,' notwithstanding the general prohibi-
tion on such joint classification contained in § 1122(a), provided only that the amounts of
the claims are less than a certain amount. The first words of § 1122(a) are 'Except as
provided in subsection (b) of this section. . . .' Subsection (b) is explicitly an exception to
the prohibition contained in subsection (a) against classifying claims that are not 'substan-
tially similar' in the same class. Consequently, the plain language of the Code provides no
express guidance concerning any restrictions on the separate classification of 'substantially
similar' claims.
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any claim that the two need to be consistent. 169 In short, subsection (b)'s
existence can be explained by a desire to legitimize the pairing of claims
based not on the relationship of the creditor to the debtor, but simply on
the amount of the claim, and the need to ensure that the amount of the
dividend check exceeds the amount of postage necessary to send it to the
creditor. This interpretation of section 1122 is firmly rooted in history.
The English Bankruptcy Act of 1869,170 the American Bankruptcy Act of
1874,'1 ' and the 1884 Massachusetts Act' 72 all explicitly treated smaller
claims differently from larger claims.
Traditional legislative intent analysis also supports the proposed con-
struction of section 1122(a). The legislative history of section 1122 simply
states that it "codifies current case law surrounding the classification of
claims .... ,,"M Both chapters XI and XII permitted "division of [un-
secured] debts into classes and the treatment thereof in different ways or
upon different terms .... ,,171 In addition, chapter X provided that a plan
"shall include in respect to creditors generally or some class of them, se-
cured or unsecured, . . .provisions altering or modifying their rights...
"175 Although Congress used different words in each context, leading to
different interpretations, 176 both classification schemes allow separate clas-
sification of claims having the same liquidation priority.1
7 7
' See In re ZRM-Oklahoma Partnership, 156 B.R. 67, 70 n.3 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1993).
170 1869 Act § 126.
171 1874 Act § 17.
... 1884 Mass. Acts, ch. 195, as amended by 1885 Mass. Acts, ch. 811, 1889 Mass. Acts, ch.
1090, 1890 Mass. Acts, ch. 350, 1897 Mass. Acts, ch. 216.
173 S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 118 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5904; H. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 406 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
6362.
17 11 U.S.C. § 757(1) (repealed 1979); 11 U.S.C. § 861(3) (repealed 1979).
175 11 U.S.C. § 616(1) (repealed 1979).
" See BROUDE, supra note 15, at T 9.02[2].
'7 Randoph Haines is critical of this interpretation, citing to the text of the Bankruptcy Com-
mission's report. Haines, supra note 7, at 2. Courts have also been critical:
It is difficult to follow Congress' instruction to apply the old case law to the new Code
provision. The old case law comes from two different sources. Chapter X of the old Act
was designed for thorough financial reorganizations of large corporations. It imposed a
very formal and rigid structure to protect the investing public. Chapter XI was designed
for small nonpublic businesses, did not permit the adjustment of a secured debt or of eq-
uity, and thus contained few investor-protection measures. The idea behind Chapter 11 of
the Code was to combine the speed and flexibility of Chapter XI with some of the protec-
tion and remedial tools of Chapter X. Thus, Congress has incorporated, for purposes of
interpreting section 1122, the case law from two provisions with different language, that
were adopted for different purposes, and that have been interpreted to mean different
things.
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As a matter of practicality, we cannot revert to non-bankruptcy law
priorities to provide a definition of what must be included in particular
classes. That strategy risks making section 1122(a) irrelevant. 178 Indeed,
Congress could have done just this by making the chapter 7 distribution
provisions mandatory in chapter 11.171 Under chapter 7, and most non-
bankruptcy liquidations, non-priority unsecured creditors are all treated
the same. They share pro-rata in whatever is left over after the secured
and priority creditors have had their claims paid. 80 Moreover, if history
had adopted that view, classification would have been irrelevant in chap-
ter XI, since it could only modify unsecured claims.
In short, if section 1122(a) is supposed to mirror non-bankruptcy law
priorities, it could have been done more directly and with less words.
Cases and commentators, however, have taken great pains to distinguish
the different motives that groups of unsecured creditors with the same
liquidation priority might have.'
Teamsters Nat'l Freight Indus. Negotiating Comm. v. United States Truck Co. (In re United States
Truck Co.), 800 F.2d 581, 586 (6th Cir. 1986).
The original report of the Bankruptcy Commission proposed the following language to handle
classification: "The administrator [now the plan proponent] shall designate classes of creditors and
equity security holders which are of substantially similar character and the members of which enjoy
substantially similar rights." H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. II, at 241 (1973). The
note to this section stated that "[tlhe liquidation priorities are applicable and claims of a substantially
similar nature must be included in the same class, except that small claims may be separately
classed." Id.
178 It also may make § 1124's provisions on impairment superfluous, since in a world where all
unsecured creditors get equal treatment, there is little need to test impairment as strictly as done in
§ 1124. See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1122.04, at 1122-20 (15th ed. 1993).
"" See Carlson, supra note 7, at 571-72. The chapter 7 distribution provisions are found in 11
U.S.C. § 726 (1988).
10 Actually, chapter 7 does not treat all non-priority, unsecured claims alike. Any fines, penal-
ties, forfeitures, or multiple, exemplary, or punitive damages are singled out for lesser treatment. 11
U.S.C. § 726(a)(4) (1988).
"' See, e.g., Steelcase Inc. v. Johnston (In re Johnston), 21 F.3d 323 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding it
proper to separately classify unsecured claim which is being hotly disputed in separate litigation);
Frito-Lay, Inc. v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 10 F.3d 944, 956-57 (2d Cir. 1993)
(holding that separate classification of tax lessors based upon whether they independently provided
debtor in possession financing is allowed); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Route 37 Business
Park Assocs., 987 F.2d 154, 159 (3d Cir. 1993) (approving and explaining In re Jersey City Medical
Ctr., 817 F.2d 1055, 1061 (3d Cir. 1987)), in which separate classification of medical malpractice tort
claims, non-priority employee benefit plan claims, and general trade creditor claims were upheld);
Heartland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Briscoe Enter., Ltd., II (In re Briscoe Enter., Ltd., 11), 994
F.2d 1160, 1167 (5th Cir. 1993) (upholding separate classification of unsecured claims held by the
City of Fort Worth, and other creditors, in single-asset real estate case, where the City contributed
cash to subsidize rentals in moderate to low income housing); Teamsters Nat'l Freight Indus. Negoti-
ating Comm. v. United States Truck Co. (In re United States Truck Co.), 800 F.2d 581, 587 (6th
Cir. 1986) (upholding separate classification of labor union based on such entity's "non-creditor"
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C. The Proposed Test and Section 1129(aXO)
Some courts and commentators assert that a test such as the one pro-
posed above either makes section 1129(a)(10) a "nullity" '82 or "eradicates
completely"1 83 its effects. They argue that Congress could not have had in
mind such a flexible standard for section 1122 when enacting section
1129(a)(10).'8 4
The problem with this argument is its premise. A flexible or expan-
sive reading of section 1122 has little to do with section 1129(a)(10). Only
if one believes that section 1129(a)(10) was intended to prevent reorgani-
zation of single asset bankruptcies, a result belied by current efforts at
bankruptcy reform, can one justify this premise.
To be sure, section 1129(a)(10) incorporates the notion of an "im-
paired class."' 5 The "class" part of this phrase, however, does not cause
the problem. Section 1124 presents the real issue. This section defines
impairment as the alteration of any of the creditor's "legal, equitable or
contractual rights to which such claim or interest entitles the holder of
such claim or interest."'86 Given the review of recent Supreme Court
cases above, it stretches logic to think that the current Court would read
section 1124 to mean any real or substantial alteration.
If we would not insert such concepts into section 1124, why do we
think that we can insert them in section 1122? Yet, section 1129(a)(10)
really does not do this. The only existing legislative history behind section
1129(a)(10) indicates that Congress was concerned with a "real" class of
interesis in reorganization).
182 In re Bloomingdale Partners, 170 B.R. 984 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1994).
182 See Meltzer, supra note 7, at 302.
See, e.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 113 S. Ct. 1562, 1566 (1993) (Court unwilling to ignore plain
meaning unless Court was able to "say that Congress would have found our straight-forward inter-
pretation [of the statute] and application of its words either absurd or illogical."); Public Citizen v.
Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454 (1989) (courts can look beyond statutory language when
plain meaning would "compel an odd result") (citing Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S.
504, 509 (1989)); EEOC v. Commercial Office Prod. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 120 (1988) (plurality opin-
ion) (rejecting the more natural reading of statutory language because such an interpretation would
lead to "'absurd or futile results . . . plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a
whole' "). Cf Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 112 S. Ct. 1146, 1149 (1992) ("We have stated
time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means
in a statute what it says there.").
285 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (1988).
186 11 U.S.C. § 1124(1) (1988). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has found impairment when a credi-
tor's position was arguably beneficially altered. L & J Anaheim Assocs. v. Kawasaki Leasing Int'l,
Inc. (In re L & J Anaheim Assocs.), 995 F.2d 940, 942 (9th Cir. 1993).
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impaired creditors. 1 7 What does this mean? Many have rushed to the
conclusion that this means that the impaired class should be "substantial;"
that is, should somehow matter in the reorganization. This may be the
wrong lens through which to look at the amendment. It can just as easily
be interpreted to address the problem of the "maximum cramdown;" the
specter that a plan agreed to by no class of non-insider creditors could be
confirmed.""8
Even with an expansive reading of section 1122, section 1129(a)(10)
continues to have meaning. It prevents impaired insiders, who may have
legitimate debt claims, from counting towards the necessary one class. It
also prevents a non-impaired class"89 from being the required class of ac-
cepting creditors because at least one class of impaired creditors must
accept.
Critics argue that this is not enough. They view the purpose of sec-
tion 1129(a)(10) differently, and see expansive classification as antagonis-
tic to that purpose. One possible response to this argument is that the
current Court interprets imputed purpose as subordinate to the actual text
used. How else can the Court construe section 522(l) as not requiring
good faith?'9o It stretches the imagination to construe the very mechanical
nature of sections 1122, 1124, and 1129(a)(10) as containing substantive
restrictions on the motives of plan proponents.
This leap of the imagination falls flat when one considers that other
provisions of the Code regulate the nexus between the result obtained and
the motive used in obtaining that result. If dissenting creditors believe that
the vote of the impaired class was improperly obtained, they can seek to
disallow it on the good faith grounds explicitly provided for in section
1126(e). " ' They can also attempt to thwart the whole plan as not being
proposed in good faith, another requirement explicitly provided for in sec-
tion 1129(a)(3) . 92
167 See Rusch, Gerrymandering and Classification, supra note 7, at 186-89.
168 See supra note 139.
189 A non-impaired class could be a class whose claims are unaltered, or a class whose claims are
paid in full. 11 U.S.C. § 1124(1), 1124(3) (1988). For non-impaired classes, the Code presumes
acceptance of the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(0 (1988).
190 Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 112 S. Ct. 1644 (1992).
191 See Carlson, supra note 7, at 614-16. See also Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Patrician St.
Joseph Partners Ltd. Partnership (In re Patrician St. Joseph Partners Ltd. Partnership), 169 B.R.
669 (D. Ariz. 1994).
19. See Rusch, supra note 7, at 202-05. Courts have used subjective standards when construing
the good faith requirement of § 1129(a)(3). See, e.g., In re Madison Hotel Assocs., 749 F.2d 410,
424-25 (7th Cir. 1984) (good faith requires that a plan achieve a result consistent with the objectives
[Vol. 11
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The real issue is that it is procedurally cheaper to knock out a plan
on classification grounds. If lawyers can present the issue as a question of
law, there need be no discovery taken on the motives of the plan propo-
nent. Dissenters can then object to the classification at the disclosure state-
ment stage, rather than during a plan confirmation.
From a policy standpoint, this may make sense. Maybe we should
limit what a plan can do before creditors vote. That certainly was the case
under equity receiverships and chapter X, but we do not write on a clean
slate. The Code attempts to balance all interests, including those held by
the debtor.19 The language in the Code allows for a low threshold for
impairment, and imposes nothing but negative restrictions on classifica-
tion. This structure, chosen by Congress, should control, not the imputed
purposes suggested by others.
D. The Proposed Test Applied
A final objection to the proposed test is that it would validate the
creation of a class having only one "sympathetic" creditor, whose claim is
only trivially altered, and that a plan proponent can use this one-creditor
class to cram down a plan over the dissent of more substantial creditors . 94
and purposes of the Code); Stolrow v. Stolrow's, Inc. (In re Stolrow's, Inc.), 84 B.R. 167, 172 (Bankr.
9th Cir. 1988) (good faith requires that a plan achieve a result consistent with the objectives and
purposes of the Code and fundamental fairness in dealing with one's creditors); In re Jorgensen, 66
B.R. 104, 109 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1986) (good faith requires that a plan achieve a result consistent with
the objectives and purposes of the Code and fundamental fairness in dealing with one's creditors); In
re New Valley Corp., 168 B.R. 73, 80-81 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1994) ("It is generally held that a plan is
proposed in good faith if there is a reasonable likelihood that the plan will achieve a result consistent
with the objectives and purpose of the Bankruptcy Code. . . . A further refinement of the test for
whether a plan is proposed in good faith is found in the notion that the plan must provide for funda-
mental fairness in dealing with creditors."); In re Rivers End Apartments, Ltd., 167 B.R. 470, 475-76
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1994); In re Gregory Boat Co., 44 B.R. 361, 366 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1992)
("Under one view, the good faith requirement of § 1129(a)(3) is met if the plan will fairly achieve a
result consistent with the objectives and purposes of the Bankruptcy Code .... Under another view,
the good faith requirement is met if the plan was proposed with honesty and good intentions, and
with a basis for expecting that a reorganization can be effected .... Under a third view, good faith
requires fundamental fairness in dealing with one's creditors."). See also Mutual Life Ins. Co. of
N.Y. v. Patrician St. Joseph Partners Ltd. Partnership (In re Patrician St. Joseph Partners Ltd.
Partnership), 169 B.R. 669 (D. Ariz. 1994).
19' Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (1988) (stating that only the debtor, not the debtor in posses-
sion or other estate representative, may file a plan during first 120 days of case) with 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(c) (1988) (in case of two confirmable plans, the court is directed to consider "the preferences
of creditors and equity security holders in determining which plan to confirm").
' -See, e.g., In re Bryson Properties XVIII, 961 F.2d 496, 502 (4th Cir. 1992) (stating that a
debtor must be prohibited from "manipulating" voting); Lumber Exch. Bldng. Ltd. Partnership v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co. (In re Lumber Exch. Bldng. Ltd. Partnership), 968 F.2d 647, 649 (8th Cir.
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Good faith limitations should handle this objection adequately."9 5
Some might think, however, that there is something odd in the crea-
tion of a one-creditor class, but this objection is too narrow to be persua-
sive. The next section demonstrates the narrowness of this objection by
applying the proposed test to common classification schemes already ap-
proved by courts.
1. Secured Claims and Equity Interests
The first step in evaluating the proposed test is to recall that current
practice validates, and even mandates, single-creditor classes in some
cases. Perhaps the most common single-creditor classes are holders of se-
cured claims. Courts have routinely classified these types of claims sepa-
rately from unsecured creditors, at least implicitly recognizing that the
difference in liquidation priorities justifies such action. 98
Even claims secured against the same collateral can result in separate
classification.197 In these cases, separate classification occurs because each
secured claim holds a different priority in the same collateral.
At the other end of the spectrum, separate classification is also the
rule and not the exception. Usually, different classes of equity securities
are explicitly distinguished by virtue of different non-bankruptcy liquida-
tion priorities and, therefore, must be classified separately." 8 In small
companies, this can often result in one-creditor classes.
2. Deficiency Claims-Both Recourse and Non-recourse
One distinct feature of the Code is that it bifurcates undersecured
1992) (holding that debtor cannot be allowed to manipulate voting); Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Greystone III Joint Venture (In re Greystone III Joint Venture), 995 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1991)
(holding that the debtor must not be allowed to "manipulate" acceptance through "artful classifica-
tion"); Hanson v. First Bank, 828 F.2d 1310, 1313 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding that debtor cannot be
allowed to classify claims solely to manipulate voting); In re Jersey City Medical Ctr., 817 F.2d 1055,
1060-61 (3d Cir. 1987); Washington Assocs. v. Citibank, N.A. (In re Washington Assocs.), 147 B.R.
827, 830 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
"' See supra note 192 and accompanying text. See also Carlson, supra note 7, at 610-14;
Rusch, Gerrymandering and Classification, supra note 7, at 202-04.
"' See Brady v. Andrew (In re Commercial West Fin. Corp.), 761 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1985); 5
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 178, at 11122-14-17; BROUDE, supra note 15, at 1 9.02[11.
But see In re Plaisades-on-the-Desplaines, 89 F.2d 214, 217-18 (7th Cir. 1937) (finding that first
mortgagees each holding liens of separate properties classified together under chapter X plan).
197 For example, the holder of a mechanic's lien against real property and a holder of a consen-
sual mortgage against that same property should be in separate classes. Kyser v. MacAdam, 117 F.2d
232, 236-37 (2d Cir. 1941). See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 178, at T 1122-15 n.31a.
198 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 29, at 1602.
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claims. In other words, it treats the holder of a secured claim for which
the collateral is worth less than the debt owed as holding two claims - a
secured claim equal to the value of the collateral, and a deficiency, or
unsecured, claim for the remainder.19
As set forth above, these bifurcated claims have different non-bank-
ruptcy priorities.20 0 The secured claim will be paid out of the collateral,
and the unsecured claim will be paid pro rata with all other unsecured
claims. Given the logic of the cases set forth above, it follows that the
secured claim should be separately classified.
Can they be classified together? Under the proposed test, the liquida-
tion priorities are different, so they should not be combined. The only
exception would be if the holder of the secured claim consents, and if the
only source of payment to the class would be collateral proceeds.20 1 In that
case, the secured creditor effectively waives its unsecured claim because
the collateral is worth less than the claim, and the only source of repay-
ment would be the collateral proceeds.
This discussion leads to the conclusion that, in at least those cases in
which the lender has a non-bankruptcy deficiency claim, it should be per-
missible to combine the deficiency claim with all other unsecured claims.
This would create a class in which all members' claims have the same
liquidation priority. It would, therefore, be presumptively proper. Plan
proponents who are not the holders of such claims, however, may have
incentives to separate the claims. Can they do this? Must they do it?
Under the proposed test, classification must be separate if the defi-
ciency claim is recognized only by virtue of the application of section
1111 (b).20 2 Since these claims have a different non-bankruptcy liquidation
priority, combining them would dilute one group's non-bankruptcy enti-
log 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
200 In re Richard Buick, Inc., 126 B.R. 840, 853 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991).
'0' If the plan proponent structured the plan so that non-collateral proceeds would be used to
pay the combined class, then other unsecured creditors could successfully allege that the plan com-
bined claims which were not "substantially similar." 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a)(1988). Their damage
would be the diversion of going concern surplus to a class having a different liquidation priority.
Alternatively, the class could dissent and claim that any disparity in payment was because the classifi-
cation unfairly discriminated in violation of § 1129(b)(1).
202 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (1988). This can happen in at least three circumstances. First, the claim
can be non-recourse by contract. This will be the case with many single asset debtors because their
lenders agreed to look only to the value of the security. Second, the claim can be non-recourse for lack
of privity, such as when a debtor obtains property subject to an existing lien, and the value of the
property obtained is less than the debt secured. See 680 Fifth Ave. Assocs. v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins.
Co. (In re 680 Fifth Ave. Assocs.), 29 F.3d 95, 98 (2d Cir. 1994). Or, third, it can arise by operation
of law, such as the application of state anti-deficiency statutes.
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tlements. The example above203 demonstrates how this is possible, as does
Professor Carlson's solvent general partner example.2" 4
Do not forget, however, about non-mandatory separate classification.
This would arise when the lender's deficiency claim is entitled to share
pro rata under non-bankruptcy law with other unsecured claims, but is
isolated in a one-creditor, dissenting class. The holder of the deficiency
claim has three protections in this instance without relying on allegedly
bad classification. First, the plan must comply with the "fair and equita-
ble" rule.205 This means that all reorganization value must be allocated to
the dissenting class before any junior class receives anything. Second, the
plan must not "discriminate unfairly" against the dissenting class. In
short, the payment made and its terms must not unreasonably favor one
class to the detriment of the dissenting class. Finally, the plan must be
proposed in good faith. That is, it must reasonably be expected to achieve
results consistent with the Bankruptcy Code.
In this context, the treatment of the separately-classed creditor should
bear no relation to the satisfaction of the requirements of section
1129(a)(10). Since the separately-classed creditor has all the protections
listed above, there is no need to investigate impairment in those consenting
classes beyond the level required in section 1124. Those who express out-
rage or find fault with such separate classification either forget the protec-
tions afforded dissenting classes by the Code, or are not satisfied with (and
not completely honest about) the level of protection that the Code does
provide.
There is a another way to look at the issue. By opting for liquida-
tion, the lender takes all the risk and gets all the reward of any uncertain-
ties in value or any upswings in price. Any gain over values realized at
foreclosure is the lender's and the lender's alone.206 That fact may influ-
ence lenders' motives towards liquidating the property of the debtor. Put
another way, not all players may have the same incentive to realize for the
benefit of all participants the excess of reorganization value over liquida-
tion value.
Separate classification can thus restore the balance by counting the
'03 See supra notes 104-09 and accompanying text.
'0' See Carlson, supra note 7.
205 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (1988).
206 Id. BARKLEY CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE 4.09[2], at 4-178 (rev. ed. 1993); JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 25-9, at 1214 (3d ed. 1988); 2 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS
IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 44.6, at 1245 (1965).
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votes of only creditors truly interested in reorganization.20 7 Those who
dissent, the holders of recourse deficiency claims, must receive treatment
which is fair and equitable and not unfairly discriminatory. That is their
ultimate protection. If the reorganization goal has any independent vital-
ity, an evaluation of motives should tip the scales in close cases in favor of
permitting separate classification.
3. Regular Trade Claims
Under the proposed test, a class consisting of any combination of un-
secured creditors is permitted.208 Evidence of this protection is that if any
class dissents, it will always have the right to invoke its absolute priority
and anti-discrimination rights under section 1129(b).209
The other reason to allow such separate classification is practical.
One aspect of the history of classification is the continuous effort to find
appropriate acceptance levels necessary to bind non-consenting creditors.
Classification is bound not only to liquidation priorities, but also to post-
confirmation treatment. The ability to separately classify is the ability to
treat certain creditors differently. 10
With most business debtors, there are several instances in which dif-
ferential treatment is desirable. Different groups of creditors may have
different risk preferences. Trade creditors may be more concerned with
the preservation of a customer or supplier, and may take equity interests
in reorganization; institutional investors may simply wish to receive cash.
Tort claimants may have no incentive to keep the business intact; ordinary
course of business creditors may have every incentive. The point is that if
classification is equivalent to liquidation priority, then plan proponents
lose great flexibility in structuring their plans so as to maximize recovery.
Given the preference for reorganization over liquidation, this may not
make sense.211
207 If the plan proponent cannot return more than liquidation value to creditors, the case should
be dismissed anyway since the plan proponent will not be able to meet the requirements of
§ 1129(a)(7).
208 Indeed, the legislative history seems to take as a given that unsecured creditors could be
placed in more than one class. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 416 (1977). See BROUDE,
supra note 15, at 9.02[2].
"0 These rights are in addition to receiving the benefit of the normal showings a plan proponent
must make, such as a showing that the plan is proposed in good faith, that the plan is in the best
interests of creditors, and that the plan is feasible.
210 See Brinkely v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage & Realty Trust (In re Le Blanc), 622 F.2d 872,
879 (5th Cir. 1980); BROUDE, supra note 15, at % 9-13.
2I See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 178, at % 1122.04, at 1122-20.
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In the most common case, trade creditors are willing to take more
risk, and institutional creditors will opt for more immediate payment.
Under our current system, this problem is resolved by group negotiation,
bounded by dissenting parties being able to invoke the cramdown and con-
firmation protections mentioned above. To give such negotiation more flu-
idity, the ability to treat creditors differently is critical. That ability is
protected by the ability to classify separately.
4. Other Possible Combinations
Classification is mechanical and easy to apply partly because it is
difficult to anticipate all possible circumstances in which separate classifi-
cation may be appropriate. So long as the various good faith and other
concerns exist, however, a link between classification and subjective mo-
tive is not necessary or appropriate.
So when else may a plan proponent separate creditors having the
same liquidation priority? Creditors whose interests are wholly antitheti-
cal to reorganization may present a compelling case for separate classifica-
tion.212 For example, a competitor who has obtained a judgment, or has a
claim, for unfair competition may want to rid itself of the debtor. Rela-
tions between a landlord and its tenant may have deteriorated to the point
of impasse. Groups such as trade unions may have reputations for tough-
ness at stake which exceed the private stake in the particular
reorganization.21
These types of creditors are "irritants" in the sense that their inter-
ests are contrary to the reorganization goal of chapter 11. This does not
mean that their claims are less-deserving. It does suggest, however, that
not all of the creditors have equal, or even similar, interests in the contin-
uation of the debtor.
Cases also exist in which separate classification may be needed to
meet policy concerns.214 A plan which proposes to distribute stock in the
212 See, e.g., Steelcase Inc. v. Johnston (In re Johnston), 21 F.3d 323, 328 (9th Cir. 1994)
(finding it proper to separately classify unsecured claim which is being hotly disputed in separate
litigation); Teamsters Nat'l Freight Indus. Negotiating Comm. v. United States Truck Co. (In re
United States Truck Co.), 800 F.2d 581, 587 (6th Cir. 1986) (upholding separate classification of
labor union based on such entity's "non-creditor" interests in reorganization).
213 United States Truck Co., 800 F.2d at 587 (noting that labor union had "non-creditor" inter-
ests to protect in reorganization).
"' See, e.g., Frito-Lay, v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 10 F.3d 944, 956-57 (2d
Cir. 1993) (separate classification of tax lessors based upon whether they independently provided
debtor in possession financing); Heartland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Briscoe Enter., Ltd., II (In re
Briscoe Enter., Ltd., 1I), 994 F.2d 1160, 1167 (5th Cir. 1993) (upholding separate classification in
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reorganized debtor in cancellation of claims may give rise to antitrust or
other similar claims. If a governmental entity holds a claim due to the
structure of a subsidy or other program offering non-market pricing, sepa-
rate classification of that claim to obtain separate treatment is appropriate,
even if it creates a single-creditor class.21 Similarly, a governmental pro-
gram may artificially designate a subsidy as a debt, and payment of that
subsidy might prejudice the claims of normal creditors. 216 Finally, some
courts have separately classified tort claims from claims incurred in the
normal course of business.217
Lastly, can creditors be separately classified based on subordination
provisions?2"' The proposed test would allow this.21 9 All unsecured, non-
priority creditors are the same to the debtor because quite often the debtor
is not even a party to the subordination agreement. Since the creditors all
have the same non-bankruptcy liquidation priority, as seen above, the
plan proponent may classify the claim in any manner it wishes. The fact
that the creditors are the same as far as the debtor is concerned also dis-
penses with the question of whether the claims must be classified together;
they may, or they may not.
May the plan combine junior and senior unsecured creditors in the
same class? Again, if subordination works as a two-step process - one
distribution to creditors, and a second among creditors in accordance with
the subordination agreement - the proposed test permits the combining
of the class. Although this affects the negotiation process, it actually seeks
to restore the relative positions of the parties set by the subordination
single-asset real estate case for the City of Fort Worth which contributed cash to subsidize rentals in
moderate to low income housing).
"" Mickerson v. Leser (In re Leser), 939 F.2d 669 (8th Cir. 1991) (finding it proper to sepa-
rately classify and provide different treatment for child support, payments).
1' In re Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc., 63 B.R. 178 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1986); BROUDE, supra
note 15, at 1 9.14.
217 John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Route 37 Business Park Assocs., 987 F.2d 154, 158-59
(3d Cir. 1993) (approving and explaining In re Jersey City Medical Ctr., 817 F.2d 1055, 1061 (3d
Cir. 1987), in which separate classification of medical malpractice tort claims, non-priority pension
claims, and trade creditors was upheld); In re EBP, Inc., 172 B.R. 241 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994);
Hi-Lo Powered Scaffolding, Inc. v. Penn (In re Hi-Lo Powered Scaffolding, Inc.), 70 B.R. 606
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987).
218 This discussion addresses contractual subordination only. Actions which would result in equi-
table subordination, authorized by § 510(c), may also justify separate classification. Olympia & York
Fla. Equity Corp. v. Bank of N.Y. (In re Holywell Corp.), 913 F.2d 873 (11th Cir. 1990).
21 The issue of classification of subordinated claims is also discussed in 5 COLLIER ON BANK-
RUPTCY, supra note 178, at 1122.03, at 1122-13; BROUDE, supra note 15, at T 9.02[3]; Carlson,
supra note 7, at 596-98; Daniel C. Cohn, Subordinated Claims: Their Classification and Voting
Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 56 AM. BANKR. L.J. 293 (1982).
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agreement. It allows the larger party to control the reorganization, while
section 510(a) preserves the benefit of the subordination bargain for all
plan treatment."2 °
V. CONCLUSION
Classification can be a confusing issue, especially if its historical ori-
gins are not considered. It also can lead one astray if it is viewed as an
end in itself, rather than as a part of a coordinated and complex scheme
for achieving reorganization.
Many parts of the reorganization process both require and rely upon
flexible classification. Those adversely affected by classification generally
have recourse through the general requirements of confirmation-good
faith, the best interests of creditors test, and feasibility. If those adversely
affected are members of a dissenting class, they also have the benefit of the
special requirements of cramdown, which includes the availability of the
absolute priority rule and the prohibition against unfair discrimination in
treatment. This article has argued that a court should reject a proposed
classification only if it negatively affects these general protections.
As recognized by section 1122, negative impact arises only when a
plan proponent combines claims or interests having different non-bank-
ruptcy priorities into one class. When that occurs, the class rights antici-
pated and protected by the cramdown powers become diluted. Although
instances of these types of classification rarely occur, they should be
disallowed.
In other cases, however, classification should be relatively open and
free. Such a result is consistent with the historical roots of classification.
Classification was originally used to ensure that creditors who voted to-
gether had the same interest in the debtor, judged primarily, but not ex-
clusively, by their relative liquidation priorities as against the debtor.
Open and free classification also comports with the Bankruptcy Code's
text. When the plan proponent's motive becomes an element to be ad-
duced in the context of claim classification, however, the system loses
much of its predictability. Unfortunately, many courts seem clueless on
this point.
To attempt to restore classification to its proper place, this article has
suggested that any classification is presumptively permissible so long as it
220 The legislative history of the .Code makes clear that a class vote in bankruptcy can change the
terms of the instrument containing the terms of the subordination. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 359 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787.
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does not combine participants with different non-bankruptcy liquidation
priorities. To the extent that this formulation permits single-creditor clas-
ses, and classes not generally permitted by many courts, this is acknowl-
edged and explained. In the end, perceived abuses should be regulated, not
through mangling the words of section 1122, but through applying the
other and varied protections provided under the Code to all creditors.

